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SUPER REGULATOR: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, AND JAPAN
Jerry W. Markham*
I. INTRODUCTION
he value of competition among regulators has been the
subject of debate in the United States ("U.S.") for some
time.' On the one hand, its advocates contend that competing
regulatory bodies will not only govern less, but also more effi-
ciently.' Proponents of centralized regulation, on the other
hand, argue that overlapping regulation is costly, inefficient,
and allows exploitation and abuses along regulatory seams.' In
supporting their arguments, however, both sides of this debate
rely largely on intuitive arguments or anecdotal evidence. This
is due to a lack of regulatory models that would provide a more
substantive measure of the efficacy of a monolithic regulator
over that of a more dispersed and competitive regulatory sys-
tem. The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The
author would like to thank Scot J. Halvorsen for his research assistance at the
law school and Elly Baxter for her research work in Japan.
1. See generally BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP
ON REGULATION OF FINANcIAL SERVICES 8 (1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM] (study considering effects of multiple regulators). The concept of
competitive regulation is often referred to as "functional" regulation. See, eg.,
Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform,
2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 89, 90 (1995) ("According to its history, functional
regulation seeks to promote competitive equality, regulatory efficiency, and
investor/consumer protection.").
2. See generally Jonathan R. Macy, The Business of Banking: Before and
After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 713 (2000) (discussing why
regulatory competition can be beneficial).
3. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 459 (1998) (arguing for regulation of risk rather than
function); Bert Ely, Functional Regulation Flunks: It Disregards Category
Blurring, AMER. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1997, at 4 (criticizing competitive regula-
tion).
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("FSA-UK") and the Financial Services Agency in Japan ("FSA-
Japan") are two agencies of recent vintage with a unified regu-
latory structure that should provide a basis of comparison with
the competitive regulatory approaches of the U.S.
Part II of this Article first describes the development of com-
peting U.S. regulatory bodies for banking, insurance, securities,
and derivatives. Part III focuses on the regulatory roles of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") and Part IV de-
scribes the competition between these two agencies and its ef-
fects. Part V discusses the changes within the structure of the
financial markets that affected the regulatory climate. After
that review, Parts VI and VII examine the roles of the FSA-UK
and FSA-Japan. Finally, Part VIII discusses the arguments for
and against competitive regulation and attempts to discern
whether a unified regulatory structure such as those in Japan
and the United Kingdom ("U.K.") is preferable to the competi-
tive approach of the SEC and CFTC.
II. FUNCTIONAL OR COMPETITIVE REGULATION IN THE U.S.
A. Banking
While the regulation of the financial services industry has
been widely dispersed among a number of regulators, this de-
centralization is a reflection of history rather than design.
Banking regulation is illustrative.' The federal government
exercised an indirect role in the regulation of banking through
the First and Second Banks of the U.S., until President Andrew
Jackson crushed that institution in the fight over the renewal of
its charter,' leaving a regulatory vacuum that the states filled
with their own banking commissions
4. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and
Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000) [hereinafter Markham, Banking
Regulation: Its History and Future].
5. See generally CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE PARTY BATTLES OF THE JACKSON
PERIOD 222-26 (1922) (describing this political battle between Andrew Jack-
son and Henry Clay); ROBERT V. REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE
UNION 397-99 (1991) (same).
6. The states had already imposed some regulatory requirements on
banks, but the "bank mania" that followed the destruction of the Bank of the
U.S.- and the Panic of 1837, which was also precipitated by Jackson, led to the
320 [Vol. 28:2
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The Civil War and the disarray of the nation's currency led to
the introduction of federal bank regulation that established the
national banks and gave regulatory authority over these insti-
tutions to the Comptroller of the Currency.7 This created a
"dual" system of banking regulation - state and federal -
which is said to have:
[Flostered what is probably the greatest mass of redundant,
otiose, and conflicting monetary legislation and the most com-
plex structure of self-neutralizing regulatory powers enjoyed
by any prominent country anywhere. It has put the federal
government and the states in competition for the number and
size of banks under their respective jurisdictions .... '
The creation of the Federal Reserve Board in the wake of the
Panic of 1907' and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") after widespread banking failures at the outset of the
Great Depression in the 1930s,' ° added further layers to this
regulatory competition. If that were not enough, Congress and
the states also provided separate regulation for savings banks"
and credit unions."2
creation of more formal banking commissions or departments. Markham,
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 4, at 226-27.
7. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
8. BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND
POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR 349-50 (1970).
9. See generally 1-2 PAUL M. WARBURG, THE FEDERAL RESERVE: ITS ORIGIN
AND GROWTH (1930).
10. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 168-69. One in four banks in
the U.S. failed during the bank panic. The Bubble Burst, LIFE, Spring 1992,
at 26.
11. States had overseen the operations of building and loan societies and
savings banks since their appearance early in the nineteenth century. Fed-
eral charters for savings banks were not available until 1978. LiSSA L.
BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES 79-81, 87 (2001). The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 cre-
ated the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to charter and supervise federal
savings and loan associations. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
252, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (2000)).
Federal insurance for these institutions was created by the National Housing
Act 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1724
(2000)), repealed by Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, tit. IV, § 407, 103
Stat. 363.
12. Federal Credit Union Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (2000)), authorized national charters
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The Great Depression had even broader effects in fostering
the balkanization of regulation in financial services. The activi-
ties of banks were already limited in scope by statute, 3 but the
Glass-Steagall Act sought to further seal off banking from other
fin-ancial service businesses by prohibiting banks from dealing
in investment banking activities." No justification has ever
been shown for this prohibition,'5 and Senator Glass himself
unsuccessfully sought its repeal one year after adoption.'6 Nev-
for credit unions. See Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 522 U.S. 479, 479-85 (1998) (describing scope of Federal Credit Union
Act). Most states already had legislation regulating such entities after Presi-
dent William Howard Taft wrote to the states in 1908, asking them to enact
authorizing legislation for credit unions. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 11,
at 89.
13. Traditionally, banks had no power to engage in commercial and real
estate transactions, except to secure a debt or as an accommodation to a cus-
tomer. 1 CARL ZOLLMANN, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING §§ 223, 224 (1936).
See also Jemison v. Citizens Savings Bank of Jefferson, 25 N.E. 264 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1890) (bank could not deal in cotton futures as either principal or agent).
The National Bank Act of 1864 also limited national bank activities in a simi-
lar fashion. See generally First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange
Bank of Baltimore, 92 U.S. 122 (1875) (discussing limitations on the opera-
tions of national banks). The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 sought to
further circumscribe the activities of banks by limiting the operations of enti-
ties within a bank holding company structure to "activities so closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto." Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000)).
14. The Glass-Steagall Act was a part of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,
48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See Se-
curities Industry Assoc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (describing pro-
visions of the Glass-Steagall Act).
15. The Glass-Steagall Act was concerned principally with the operations
of the securities affiliates operated by several large banks, the most important
of which was the First National City Co. affiliated with the National City
Bank (now Citigroup). The affiliates had been created despite a ruling from
the Solicitor General of the U.S. that such operations were not permitted by
the National Bank Act. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-
1970), at 57-58 (2002) [hereinafter 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
U.S.]. A study of some 3,000 national bank failures before 1936 found that
bank securities activities were low on the list of factors that resulted in bank
insolvencies. A representative from the Federal Reserve Board also testified
during the hearings on the Glass-Steagall legislation that such a prohibition
was unnecessary. Id. at 168.
16. Id. at 371.
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ertheless, the legislation remained the "'Maginot Line' of the
financial world,"'" excluding banks from many of the financial
activities of broker-dealers until its repeal in 1999 by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA").' 8
B. Insurance
Another sector of the financial services industry is insurance.
It too owes its competing regulatory structure to history. The
states had gradually imposed regulation on insurance compa-
nies to prevent abuses and regarding the maintenance of re-
sources adequate to meet claims.'9 A scandal in the insurance
industry at the beginning of the twentieth century resulted in
an investigation by a legislative committee of the New York leg-
islature." Headed by State Senator William Armstrong, the
investigation uncovered several abuses resulting in legislation
that, among other things, barred the insurance industry from
underwriting and other securities activities, restricted its abil-
ity to invest in stocks, and separated insurance companies from
the banking industry." Since New York was then the center of
insurance, its lead was followed by other states.
Thereafter, the doctrine of unexpected consequences came
into play. Sealed off from the securities industry, the insurance
companies could not participate in the market excesses of the
1920s and thus avoided the devastation visited on investors fol-
17. Bevis Longstreth, Current Issues Facing the Securities Industry and the
SEC, Address Before the Securities Industry Association, May 4, 1982, quoted
in, Jonathan Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial
Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (1984).
18. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
19. Massachusetts regulated its insurance companies in 1837 and New
York in 1851. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance:
Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, 728
(2000).
20. Id. at 730. The Committee was formed after news reports that James
Hyde, a twenty-three year old heir who had assumed control of the Equitable
Life Assurance Co. in New York, had thrown a $100,000 party at Sherry's
restaurant. Id. Concern was expressed that Hyde was looting the insurance
company to fund his extravagant life style. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY
OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 18-20. Among the attendees at the party at
Sherry's was Franklin D. Roosevelt. DENIS BRIAN, PULITZER: A LIFE 299
(2001).
21. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 18-20.
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lowing the Stock Market Crash of 1929. The insurance compa-
nies also escaped the massive failures in the banking sector and
thus eluded the scrutiny of President Roosevelt and Congress in
the New Deal legislation regulating banking and commodity
futures. But this escape was a narrow one - the Temporary
National Economic Committee ("TNEC") rejected an SEC pro-
posal to create a federal agency to regulate insurance compa-
nies only after vigorous opposition from the industry.-
The next federal regulatory threat came from the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association,"' which held that the insurance industry was sub-
ject to the federal antitrust laws. There was fear that this
would impair the ability of insurance companies to pool statis-
tics and preempt state regulation. Receptive to such concerns,
Congress then passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 4 which
granted insurance companies immunity from the antitrust laws
to the extent that they were regulated by state insurance laws.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act largely excluded any federal
regulation until insurance companies began offering variable
annuities in 1952." The SEC claimed that variable annuities
were securities subject to regulation under the federal securi-
ties laws because returns were based on the investment of the
annuitants' premium payments in securities. The Supreme
22. Another SEC proposal would have allowed federal agents to inspect
insurance companies, but it too failed to be adopted. The SEC also wanted
insurance companies, which were one of the largest sources of finance for
large corporations, to invest in greater amounts of common stocks. Corporate
balance sheets were becoming over-leveraged by debt sold to the insurance
companies, and this concerned the TNEC, as well as the SEC. Id. at 245-50.
The insurance industry defeated these proposals by pointing out that
avoiding stocks as an investment for insurance company reserves had saved
the industry from disaster when the market collapsed in the wake of the Stock
Market Crash of 1929. TNEC, Investigation of Concentration of Economic
Power, Monograph No. 28A: Statement of Life Insurance, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
4 (1941).
23. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
24. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2000)).
25. The variable annuity was the invention of the College Retirement Eq-
uities Fund ("CREF"), an affiliate of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association ('TIAA"). See CEDRIC V. FRICKE, THE VARIABLE ANNUITY: ITS
IMPACT ON THE SAVINGS-INVESTMENT MARKET 2 (1959).
324 [Vol. 28:2
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Court found for the SEC in these cases, 6 resulting in dual regu-
lation of insurance companies selling variable contracts, as they
were required to separate reserves for such products from re-
serves for more traditional insurance.
Despite some frightening losses in the late 1980s that led to
calls for federal regulation, the insurance industry was able to
avoid most other federal intrusions.28 What the industry could
not avoid, however, was competition from the banking and se-
curities industries. This was because the variable annuity was
a product that was sold by stockbrokers, who did so in large
numbers. 9 Federal bank regulators also opened the door for
banks to sell insurance products in the 1990s."° This resulted in
a restructuring of the insurance industry - insurance compa-
nies demutalized and expanded their own financial service of-
ferings."
C. Securities
Further separation of financial services into distinct sectors
came through the adoption of legislation to regulate the securi-
ties industry during the Great Depression. The SEC's history
and background is well-known2 - it was a product of the Stock
Market Crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression." The
26. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Vari-
able Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
27. Broome & Markham, supra note 19, at 737.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 743 (describing broker-dealer competition).
30. The banks used a statute that many thought had been repealed to gain
entry into the insurance industry. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Indep.
Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439 (1993). See also Barnett Bank of Marion County,
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (states unable to restrict banks from selling
insurance).
31. Broome & Markham, supra note 19, at 745-46.
32. For the uninitiated, see generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1995).
33. The causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1929 are still widely debated.
Blame is attributed to, inter alia, excessive speculation through margin ac-
counts and abusive market practices, such as the organized pools that oper-
ated in over one hundred NYSE stocks in the 1920s. More recent focus has
centered on the blunders of the Federal Reserve System, which first eased
credit in order to support England's effort to return to the gold standard,
thereby boosting the market. The Federal Reserve then reversed course and
325
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SEC, which was ultimately given regulatory authority over the
statutes that now comprise the federal securities laws, operates
on a principle of full disclosure." In adopting this legislation,
Congress did not preempt the regulation of sales of securities
under state blue-sky laws, thereby creating a competing layer of
governmental regulation that was not lessened until late in the
twentieth century.35 Aside from some tinkering principally de-
sought to curb the market through ill-conceived interest rate increases, an
echo of recent events. There is also the possibility that the market was simply
over-heated and needed correction. See 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE U.S., supra note 15, at 143-45, 150-53. Similar controversy exists over
what caused and prolonged the Great Depression. Some claim that the mar-
ket crash itself caused the depression - post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Indeed,
recessions and depressions often follow a market crash, but that may suggest
no more than that the market anticipates the economic decline. Today, most
economists seem to agree that the Stock Market Crash of 1929 was not the
cause of the Great Depression or its impressive duration. See generally Marco
A. Espinosa-Vega & Jang-Ting Guo, On Business Cycles and Countercyclical
Policies; Statistical Data Included, 86 ECON. REv. 1 (2001) (discussing eco-
nomic theories on causes of the Great Depression). One author has even
stated that the Stock Market Crash of 1929 "was probably an event of rela-
tively minor significance" in causing the Great Depression. CHARLES R.
MORRIS, MONEY, GREED, AND RISK: WHY FINANCIAL CRISES AND CRASHES
HAPPEN 73 (1999). See also The Crash of 1929 - A New View, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 28, 1977, at 16 (blaming tariff increases and increases in income tax).
34. The statutes administered by the SEC are the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (2000) (requiring full disclosure in connection with
new offerings of securities to the public); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000) (creating the SEC and requiring continual
financial reporting by public companies, providing SEC regulatory control
over proxy solicitations and tender offers, and regulating'the secondary mar-
kets in publicly owned securities); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (2000) (simplifying the holding company struc-
ture of public utilities); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
bbbb (2000) (regulating the administration of debentures issued under trust
indentures); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 to 80a-64
(the world's most complex statute seeks to regulate investment companies,
including mutual funds); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000) (regulating and registering investment advisors).
35. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 preempted
much state securities regulation or required the states to conform their stan-
dards to those of the SEC. The act exempted Nasdaq and exchange listed
stocks from state regulation. Also exempted were investment companies and
investment advisers with significant amounts of funds under management.
State broker-dealer record-keeping, net capital, and other requirements regu-
lating such entities were required to conform to those of the SEC. The SEC
broadened its record-keeping requirements for broker-dealers to address the
326 [Vol. 28:2
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signed to increase regulation, the federal securities laws remain
more or less in the form arrived at in the 1930s."
Another competing regulatory structure also remains - that
of the self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"). These non-
governmental organizations were given regulatory authority,
states' fear that such preemption would frustrate their regulation of broker-
dealers. See generally 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 6.02
(2001) (describing SEC rule amendments).
36. Tinkering may be a bit of an understatement. For example, amend-
ments were made in 1964 to strengthen financial reporting by public compa-
nies. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000). See generally Richard Phillips & Morgan
Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE
L.J. 706. In 1968, the Williams Act began regulating tender offers and played
an important role in the merger mania of the 1980s. Williams Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (2000)). For
a description of the Williams Act, see Miriam P. Hechler, Toward a More Bal-
anced Treatment of Bidder and Target Shareholders, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 319. In 1970, after a "paperwork crisis" that resulted in the failure of
numerous firms, Congress created the Securities Investor Protection Act
("SIPA") and the SIPA Corporation ("SIPC") that provides insurance for bro-
ker-dealer bankruptcies. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (2000). For a description of the
problems that led to the paperwork crisis and the creation of SIPA, see SEC,
STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 91-231 (1971). Legislation enacted in
1975 regulated clearing and settlement activities, imposed more stringent
regulation over broker-dealer operations, established regulation over munici-
pal bond dealers, and sought to create a national market system. For a de-
scription, see S. REP. No. 94-75 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179;
H.R. REP. No. 94-123 (1975). Dealers in U.S. government securities were regu-
lated after scandals involving unregistered "repo" dealers. Government Secu-
rities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986). For a description
of the problems in the repo market, see H.R. REP. No. 99-258 (1985); S. REP.
No. 99-426 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5395; Regulating Govern-
ment Securities Dealers: Hearing on H.R. 2032 Before Subcomm. On Tele-
comm., Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 99th Cong. 201-13 (1985) (Report by John S. R. Shad, Chairman, Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (June 20, 1985)). Insider trading sanctions
were also strengthened after a series of scandals. See Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2000)); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1 (2000)). For a description of those scandals, see DAVID
A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991). Additional legislation
was enacted to deal with penny stock fraud after a series of swindles. Securi-
ties Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78q-2 (2000)).
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and shelter from the antitrust laws,37 by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,38 under which the exchanges, and later the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), 3 are
required to regulate the conduct of their members. The role of
the SEC in this self-regulation is to oversee the exchanges, as
well as to act directly where SRO oversight fails." The SRO con-
cept actually added several layers of regulators. In addition to
the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the
SROs came to include the regional exchanges (e.g., the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange) and
the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. ("CBOE"). The crea-
tion of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board added an-
other element of self-regulation that gave rulemaking authority
to this entity, but left enforcement with the SEC and bank regu-
lators.4'
Though the SROs generally attempt to coordinate their regu-
lation in order to avoid duplication, there has been some compe-
tition among the SROs (such as the rivalry between the stock
exchanges over options trading once it became clear that the
CBOE would succeed).42 The SEC initially sought to quash the
37. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United
States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734-35 (1975); Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).
39. Self-regulation by the NASD was added in 1938 by the Maloney Act, 52
Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000)). See generally
United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (discuss-
ing role of NASD).
40. This process has been most vividly described by Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas, a former SEC chairman. His concept of self-regulation is:
[Olne of letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government
playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but
with the hope it would never have to be used.
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1), (c) (2000).
42. The American Stock Exchange was the first to seek to add options trad-
ing to its products after the creation of the CBOE. In the Matter of the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange, Inc. Plan to List and Trade Options, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-11,144, (Dec. 19, 1974), 1974 SEC LEXIS 2108. The NYSE was
at first uninterested in options trading and encountered opposition from the
SEC when it did seek entry in later years. The SEC feared that options
traded on the NYSE would be subject to abuse by specialists. It also ex-
[Vol. 28:2328
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competition by requiring coordinated trading and clearance 3
under the aegis of a "central market" doctrine, adopted early in
the 1970s." After endeavoring to regulate competition on the
pressed a similar concern with market makers trading over-the-counter op-
tions. See Termination of the Options Moratorium, Exchange Act Release No.
34-16,701, 19 S.E.C. Docket 998 (Mar. 26, 1980). This concern with side-by-
side trading was not overcome by the SEC until 1985. It then allowed the
NYSE to trade options, but required the exchange to conduct such trading
from a location separate from its stock trading floor. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO
THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001), at 53 (2002) [hereinafter 3 MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.]. By that time, the market was too mature for
successful competition by the NYSE, and it transferred its options operations
to the CBOE in the mid-1990s. Dan Colarusso, Investing: A New Options
Market That Hums, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, Sec. 3, at 7.
43. Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options
- Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALBANY L. REV. 741,
749-50 (1983).
44. As noted by one authority:
[11n 1971, in a letter transmitting its Institutional Investor Study to
Congress, the SEC stated: "A major goal and ideal of the securities
markets and the securities industry has been the creation of a strong
central market system for securities of national importance, in
which all buying and selling interest in these securities could partici-
pate and be represented under a competitive regime."
The SEC acknowledged that "this represented something of a shift in
the historic position of the Commission, which over many years, ex-
tending from before World War II to at least the Special Study Report
of 1963, tended to favor competing but separate markets." The shift
was prompted not by any lessened concern over the dangers of con-
solidation, but, rather, by the deus ex machina of modern technology.
The SEC and others saw in the technological developments in com-
munications and computers a way to capture the benefits of consoli-
dation without inhibiting competition.
In 1975, Congress indicated that it agreed with the SEC, enacting the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which called for the SEC to "fa-
cilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities."
In this national market system the efforts of individual marketplaces
to achieve consolidation at the expense of other marketplaces were to
be displaced by a much grander national effort that would no longer
recognize marketplace boundaries.
Jeffry L. Davis & Lois E. Lightfoot, Fragmentation Versus Consolidation of
Securities Trading: Evidence from the Operation of Rule 19c-3, 41 J. L. &
ECON. 209, 210-11 (1998).
The central market got nowhere in the stock markets. The SEC sought
to require a "universal message switch" that would have required customer
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options exchanges for many years, the SEC finally began en-
couraging the multiple trading of options on the same securi-
ties.45 Still, after the creation of the Nasdaq market the compe-
tition between the NYSE and the NASD was even fiercer,46 and
in later years led to criticism that the NASD had allowed its
competitive role in marketing Nasdaq to outweigh its regula-
tory responsibilities. In the end, the NASD was forced to sepa-
rate and spin off its regulatory body into NASD Regulation, Inc.
("NASDR"). 8
The SEC regulatory structure also increased in complexity
over the years with the introduction of other entities that have
now been designated "gatekeepers,"49 such as the accountants
that certify the financial statements of public companies and
orders to be routed to the market with the best execution price. The agency
was unable to mandate such a system and instead agreed to the creation of
the "Intermarket Trading System," under which exchange specialists execute
orders at the best price available on any other exchange. This essentially
meant that specialists on the regional exchanges would have access to NYSE
quotes and could key off those quotes instead of competing separately. See
generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC
BULLS AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 47-
48 (Sept. 1990) (description of universal message switch and Intermarket
Trading System); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON SECURITIES TRADING: SEC ACTION NEEDED TO
ADDRESS NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM ISSUES (March 1990) (description of cen-
tral market system issues).
45. The SEC has been allocating options on particular stocks to the options
exchanges by lottery. It was not until 1989 that the SEC allowed options on
particular securities to be traded on more than one exchange. 3 MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 85. Thereafter, it sought to
encourage such trading. See Multiple Trading of Standardized Options, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-26,870, 43 S.E.C. Docket 1498 (May 26, 1989). The
options exchanges were censured in 2000 for agreeing not to multiply list op-
tions as mandated by the SEC. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.,
supra note 42, at 331.
46. Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for
Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17 (1986) (description of de-
velopment and growth of the Nasdaq market).
47. See generally In the Matter of National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-37,542, 62 S.E.C. Docket 1385 (Aug. 8,
1996) (describing collusion by Nasdaq market makers).
48. Id.
49. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) (discussing role
of gatekeepers and advocating liability).
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broker-dealers." Accountants had maintained control over their
audit procedures for some time, though the SEC would occa-
sionally intervene. One concern was competition, i.e., that cor-
porate management would shop for the least strict auditor. The
SEC has attacked such practices,52 and, further, adopted rules
that sought to assure that auditors remained independent of
their audit clients. 3 However, the independence standards
were questioned after the SEC discovered that numerous part-
ners in audit firms held stock in their audit clients. 4 Consulting
50. The role of accountants was widely expanded by the adoption of the
federal securities laws. Publicly owned companies were required to publish
certified accounting statements. The SEC also imposed auditing requirements
on broker-dealers. Reports to be Made by Certain Brokers and Dealers, 17
C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (2002) (FOCUS report requirement).
The gatekeeper role of accountants, and their "deep pockets," led to
efforts to impose liability under the federal securities laws when a company
unexpectedly failed during an accounting firm audit. The Supreme Court
relieved the accounting profession of liability under SEC Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2002)) based on negligence in their audits. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Further protection was provided when the
Supreme Court rejected private rights of action for aiding and abetting on the
part of professionals such as accountants and lawyers. Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
51. The SEC deferred for the most part to the accounting profession in
developing what are called "generally accepted accounting principles," or
"GAAP." 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 9.6[11 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter HAZEN TREATISE]. The Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), an industry group, took the lead
in developing or changing particular GAAP standards. See generally Marshall
S. Armstrong, The Work and Workings of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, 29 Bus. LAw. 145 (1974) (describing role of FASB). Regulation S-X,
however, imposed various accounting requirements in public offerings. Appli-
cation of Regulation S-X (17 C.F.R. part 210), 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to 210.1-
02 (2002). The SEC has also adopted particular accounting standards in its
filings by rule, and issues Accounting Series Releases on matters it deems not
adequately addressed by the accounting profession.
Until recently, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") set "generally accepted auditing standards," or "GAAS." 2 HAZEN
TREATISE, supra § 9.6[1]. The SEC further assumed the authority to discipline
accountants that failed to meet what the agency deemed were appropriate
auditing standards. 17 C.F.R. § 210.102(e) (2002).
52. 2 HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 9.6[11.
53. Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2002).
54. In one large accounting firm, the SEC found that thirty-one of the top
forty-three partners held stock in audit clients. A total of 8,000 violations of
independence standards were found by partners and employees of the ac-
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operations created by accounting firms were also creating con-
flicts. As a result, the SEC acted to strengthen its independ-
ence standards.55 Congress also jumped on the bandwagon and
required auditors to report violations by their clients. Most
recently, the Enron debacle and other accounting scandals
heightened regulatory concern over the role of these gatekeep-
ers." In the end, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-
Oxley") created a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
to oversee the auditing principles and practices of auditors. 8
Another set of gatekeepers is the Nationally Recognized Sta-
tistical Ratings Organizations ("NRSROs"), i.e., ratings agen-
cies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The SEC gave
such organizations a quasi-official role in applying its net capi-
counting firm. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42,
at 257.
55. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,602, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000).
56. Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required audits to
be conducted in accordance with GAAS. Independent auditors were required
to conduct their audits in a manner that would uncover illegal activities and
to report that conduct to management and to the board of directors if man-
agement fails to act. The board of directors must then report the violative
activity to the SEC or if it fails to do so, the auditor must inform the SEC. 15
U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000).
57. Enron Corporation was the seventh largest company on the Fortune
500 index when it failed in October 2001. After the Enron scandal, a number
of other firms were also found to have engaged in various questionable ac-
counting practices. Several energy companies were involved in "round trip"
trades that artificially increased their income by billions of dollars. Global
Crossing Ltd., a large telecommunications firm declared bankruptcy after an
accounting scandal. It was followed by WorldCom, Inc., which had improperly
booked some $7 billion in revenues. The bankruptcy of WorldCom was the
largest such event in U.S. history, superseding Enron for that dubious honor.
See Greg Hitt, Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate
Fraud, WALL ST. J., July, 31, 2002, at A4.
58. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board took away control of
accounting standards from the accounting profession. Accountants certifying
the financial standards of public companies are now required to register with
the Board and conform to the standards it sets. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, §§ 101-09, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Some large accounting
firms had already spun off consulting services (e.g., Accenture), and immedi-
ately after this legislation IBM purchased the consulting operations of an-
other giant accounting firm. William Bulkeley & Kemba Dunham, IBM
Speeds Move to Consulting With $3.5 Billion Acquisition, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2002, at Al.
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tal rule.5 That status, and the increasingly important role of
the ratings agencies, created the impression that these entities
were gatekeepers. Although NRSROs compete with each other
for business, critics have claimed that the ratings agencies do
not fulfill their gatekeeping responsibilities due to the conflict of
interest they face, i.e., their compensation is paid by the very
companies they rate." Sarbanes-Oxley now requires the SEC to
conduct a study of the NRSROs and to report to Congress on
any deficiencies, raising the likelihood that these gatekeepers
will be subject to regulation in the future.'
Financial analysts are another class of securities sector par-
ticipants that have been elevated to gatekeeper status. The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 first applied some regulation
to this field. 2 However, Congress sought to limit this regulation
to those entities rendering personal advice, which excluded pub-
lications to the general public, a distinction the SEC was unable
to discern.63 Financial analysts have also been a particularly
59. For example, the SEC defers to the NRSROs in determining whether a
"ready market" exists for purposes of valuing securities in inventory under its
net capital rule. See, e.g., Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers,
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E) (2002) (valuation of money instruments);
Capital Committee of the Securities Industry Association (c/o Merrill Lynch &
Co.), SEC No-Action Letter, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,280, at 77, 051 (June 12, 1992) ("ready market" treatment for debt securi-
ties of foreign issuers).
60. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Mar-
kets? Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619
(1999) (describing shortcomings of rating agencies). The rating agencies were
also criticized for not predicting the demise of the Enron Corporation. See
Hearings before the United States S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th
Cong. (2002) (testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego School of Law).
61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 702.
62. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000).
The investment adviser is relatively new to the securities industry, having
appeared in force only after World War I. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO SECTION 30 OF THE
PUBLIC UTILITIES HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935: INVESTMENT COUNSEL,
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT FUTURE PRICES, AND INVESTMENT
ADVISORY SERVICES 3 (1939) ("The emergence of investment counselors as an
important independent occupation, or profession, did not appear until after
the close of the World War").
63. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985).
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sharp thorn in the SEC's side. While the analysts' product
value depends to some degree on their ability to analyze the
massive amounts of information influencing the value of the
stocks, the real value they added over the years was their abil-
ity to obtain information that was not generally available to the
public. The SEC's mandate was full disclosure, but the agency
wanted such disclosure only on its terms, prompting it to bring
an insider trading case against an analyst that sold out his in-
stitutional clients when he learned of a massive fraud at Equity
Funding, a company he had been following." The Supreme
Court threw out the case,65 but the SEC remained concerned
with the role of financial analysts. Selective disclosure given
to analysts by corporate officials was an informational advan-
tage at which the SEC balked, and subsequently proscribed un-
der Regulation FD. 7
Denied this informational advantage as a product to sell, ana-
lysts were left to tout stocks like snake oil salesmen. 8 This led
64. Mitchell C. Lynch, Security Analysis and the Law, WALL ST. J., Sept.
15, 1978, at 16.
65. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
66. Broker-dealers are required to maintain a "Chinese Wall" (an "inviola-
ble wall" for the politically correct) between the analysts and the underwriting
arms of the firm. Restricted lists are also used to assure that analysts do not
have access to non-public information. See generally David A. Lipton &
Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Secu-
rities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975).
67. General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100
(2002). This regulation seems to be based on a bit of twisted government
logic, i.e., full disclosure to everyone at the same time or no disclosure to any-
one. In the apparent view of the SEC, it is better that the market not receive
information that will more efficiently value a company unless everyone has
the information at precisely the same time. The SEC should be encouraging
information flows, not discouraging access by professionals who will be paid
for ferreting out material information, analyzing it, and disseminating it to
the market through their clients. See generally Jerry Duggan, Regulation FD:
SEC Tells Corporate Insiders to "Chill Out," 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POLICY 159
(2001) (criticizing Regulation FD).
68. Mary Meeker, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, was given the title of
"queen of the net" for hyping IPO internet stock offerings that her firm was
underwriting. JOHN CASSIDY, DOT.CON, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 206-
17 (2002). See also generally Randall Smith & Susanne Craig, Will Grubman
Case Tone Down the Exaggeration by Analysts?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, at
C1. Jack Grubman, an analyst at Salomon Smith Barney, was alleged to have
pumped telecommunications stocks so that his firm could obtain their under-
writing business. Charles Gasparino, Salomon's Grubman Resigns: NASD
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to scandal when it was discovered that Henry Blodget, an ana-
lyst at Merrill Lynch, had been publicly praising one stock
while describing it as a "piece of junk" in an internal email.
Merrill Lynch was fined $100 million after this was discovered.69
The fine was imposed by Eliot Spitzer, the New York State At-
torney General, whose recent crusades provide evidence of an-
other layer of regulation in the securities industry. ° Finally,
Sarbanes-Oxley sought to further separate the analysts from
their investment banking associates and gave the SEC author-
ity to adopt rules for that purpose. The SEC, thereafter, began
examining proposals to require analysts to be independent of
their investment banking colleagues.72
Sarbanes-Oxley added still another gatekeeper, as the SEC
was given authority to issue rules setting forth standards of
conduct for attorneys advising public companies. 3 Attorneys
are now required to report violations of securities laws, inter
alia, to a board committee composed entirely of outside direc-
tors if the company fails to take corrective action. 4 This means
that lawyers are now policemen and not just advisors." More-
Finds "Spinning" at Firm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2002, at Al; Charles Gas-
parino, Salomon Agrees to Settle Stock-Hype Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002,
at C1.
69. Patrick McGeehan, E-Mail Gaps May Mean Fines for Big Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C1.
70. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
71. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 501, Pub. L. No.107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002).
72. Michael Schroeder, SEC to Consider Step in Analysts' Independence,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, at C7.
73. The SEC adopted the Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Pro-
fessional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-
47,276, 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (S.E.C. Jan. 29, 2003), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8815.htm.
74. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 307.
75. Such a role for lawyers had been rejected many years ago. A scandal at
the National Student Marketing Corporation resulted in a drive by the SEC to
punish lawyers representing companies violating the federal securities laws.
See Stan Crock, SEC to Consider Rule Requiring Lawyers to Disclose Fraud
by Corporate Clients, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1978, at 5 (American Bar Associa-
tion asserts that lawyers are advisors and not policemen). However, the SEC
later rejected a proposal that would have required corporate lawyers to report
management wrongdoing to the board of directors and to the SEC. See SEC
Rejects Bid to Force Firms' Lawyers to Tell Boards of Employee Wrongdoing,
WALL ST. J., May 1, 1980, at 4 (SEC defers to ABA on this issue).
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over, the reference to outside directors is further evidence of yet
another gatekeeper - the outside director himself."6 The SEC
has long attempted to strengthen the role of these directors, to
the point of seeking to require all but one director to be inde-
pendent of management, thereby leaving the running of a com-
pany in the hands of those unfamiliar with its day-to-day opera-
tions." Finally, various "whistleblower" statutes seek to protect
employees reporting misconduct.78 One such employee achieved
fame for reporting Enron's questionable accounting practices to
senior management before they became publicly known. 9 Sar-
banes-Oxley enshrines her act into legislation by requiring pub-
lic corporations to adopt procedures to encourage such whistle-
blowing."
76. The NYSE has also ruled that outside directors must constitute a ma-
jority of the board of directors of publicly owned corporations listed on the
exchange. Gaston Ceron, Deals & Deal Makers: NYSE to Firm Governance,
Add Trading Floor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at C5.
77. See Burt Schorr, Board Breakup, Corporate Directors Scored for Lax
Scrutiny of Managements' Acts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1978, at 1 (describing
efforts by SEC to make corporate board more independent of management).
In 1978 the NYSE began requiring its listed companies to have an audit com-
mittee composed of outside directors. Peter F. Drucker, The Real Duties of a
Director, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1978, at 20. An SEC Chairman went so far as to
advocate that management should have only one slot on the board of directors.
Management Should Fill Only One Seat on of Firms' Board of Directors, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 3. The SEC Chairman soon had to backtrack from
this wild proposal. Letters to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1978, at 22.
Compare, Joann S. Lublin, Outsiders In, Firms Add More Independent Direc-
tors, But Finding Doing So Can Mean Headaches, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1978,
at 38 (describing shortcomings of outside directors), with, Joann S. Lublin,
How CEOs Retire in Style, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at BI (describing
twenty-four years later lucrative compensation given to executives after nego-
tiation with independent directors). See generally SEC Report Warns Outside
Directors of Duty to Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1978, at 3 (outside direc-
tors should have called board meeting to challenge management disclosures or
should have resigned).
78. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (2000) (federal whistleblower statute);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102 (2002) (state whistleblower statute). The Cali-
fornia Senate has passed a bill that would require corporate officers to report
accounting abuses to the attorney general. Robert Salladay, "Snitch" Bill
Passed by State Senate, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2002, at A17.
79. See Newsmakers, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 22, 2002, at A2. Sherron
Watkins honored for disclosing questionable accounting practices at Enron to
the Company's Chief Executive Officer, Ken Lay. She did not report the prob-
lem to any regulator. Id.
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 806, Pub. L. No.107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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If all of these gatekeepers and regulators are not enough,
there are still real gorillas to contend with - the private attor-
neys general bringing class action lawsuits under the federal
securities laws." As corporate America was drowning in a mo-
rass of litigation from these plaintiffs, efforts to curb some of
the worst abuses led to the passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.82 Nonetheless, the amount of
litigation only increased.83 Additional pressure was coming from
81. Broker-dealers might be viewed either as gatekeepers or as a part of
the SRO structure. Broker-dealers are required to register with the SEC (15
U.S.C. § 78o (2000)) and to supervise their employees (15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(4)(E), (G)(iii) (2000)). See also Bevis Longstreth, Duty to Supervise is
Critical to Effective Self-Regulation, NAT. L.J., May 16, 1983, at 24. Broker-
dealers are also subject to the rules of the exchanges of which they are mem-
bers and to the rules of NASDR. Adoption of Rules under Section 15(b)(10) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-8135
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,459, at 82,890 (July
27, 1967).
82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737. The abuses in litigation included the use of "professional plain-
tiffs" to bring class action lawsuits and the routine filing of lawsuits whenever
there was a significant change in the price of a stock. Jordan Eth & Daniel S.
Drossman, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Five Years Young, 34
Sec. & Commodities Reg. 153, 153 n.3 (July 2001). See generally Richard M.
Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAw. 1009 (1996) (describing abuses). The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was avoided by bringing class
actions in state court. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. The Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, sought to plug that
loophole, but another gap was found. See Joshua D. Ratner, Shareholders'
Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the Uniform Standards
Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035 (2001).
83. Critics claim that reform efforts to curb abusive litigation have had
little effect. Id. Compare Common Sense Legal Reform Act, Hearings on H.R.
10 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Com-
merce, 104th Cong., 73-86 (1995) (testimony of William S. Lerach, partner,
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach) (statistics suggesting that there was
no inordinate increase in the number of class action lawsuits involving securi-
ties claims), with CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST REFORM ACT SECURITITES
CASE SETTLEMENTS, 2001: A YEAR IN REVIEW (2002). This study by the Stan-
ford Law School Securities Class Action Clearing House and Cornerstone Re-
search found a 60% increase over 2000 in the number of class actions filed.
The companies who were defendants in those actions lost more than $2 tril-
lion in market capitalization after those suits were filed. Id.
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an increasingly active Justice Department that had created
special units in several of its U.S. Attorney offices to prosecute
securities violators. Sarbanes-Oxley furthers that effort by in-
creasing criminal penalties for violations of the federal securi-
ties laws to draconian levels.84 Another phenomenon of recent
years has been the attorney general "wolf packs" that are at-
tacking businesses, including Microsoft and the tobacco compa-
nies, on a national scale, thereby setting their own national
regulatory policies.8
D. Commodity Futures and Options
Like the securities sector, the regulation of commodity fu-
tures trading was cordoned off from other parts of the financial
services industry. That decision was again the result of history,
rather than the implementation of a measured economic theory
of regulatory competition. In response to the agricultural reces-
sion that followed World War I, Congress enacted the Futures
Trading Act of 1921,6 which was then declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court as an impermissible use of the congres-
sional taxing powers. 7 A manipulation of grain prices occurring
just a few days after the Supreme Court's decision, however,
convinced Congress that regulation was needed," and it passed
the Grain Futures Act of 192289 under its commerce powers.
84. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 1106.
85. See Michael Freedman, Wall Street's Worst Nightmare, FORBES, Aug.
12, 2002, at 44 (describing tactics of attorney general wolf packs and noting
that Alabama securities administrator wants to pursue Wall Street); Russell
Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crimebusters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at B1
(describing attorney general network). The Connecticut Supreme Court re-
cently held that the state attorney general did not have standing to bring
action to correct wrongs wherever they might be found. Blumenthal v. Bar-
nes, 804 A.2d 152 (Conn. 2002). Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney Gen-
eral, has been particularly aggressive in attacking businesses in order to gar-
ner publicity for himself. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
86. Futures Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921). This legislation was
preceded by an intensive study of the grain markets by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), which found numerous abuses. 1-7 FED. TRADE COMM'N,
REPORT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM'N ON THE GRAIN TRADE (1920-1921).
87. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 (1922).
88. H.R. REP. No. 67-1095, at 2 (1922).
89. Commodity Exchange Act (Grain Futures Act), ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998
(1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (2000)).
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This legislation was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme
Court.'
The Grain Futures Act required commodity futures trading to
be conducted on organized exchanges, such as the Chicago
Board of Trade, which would register with the government as
"contract markets."9" The goal was to stop "bucket shop" opera-
tions that were fleecing unsuspecting investors9" and to provide
some regulatory controls that would halt the manipulation of
agricultural commodity prices that all too often roiled the mar-
kets.93 The Act was administered by the Grain Futures Admini-
stration, an agency within the Department of Agriculture.94 It
proved to be unsuccessful in stopping manipulations or prevent-
ing devastation in the agricultural community during the Great
Depression, when prices dropped to unprecedented lows.9
President Roosevelt added to his call for regulation of the se-
curities markets a request for legislation to regulate the futures
90. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923).
91. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, §§ 5-7, 42 Stat. 998, 1000 (1922).
92. Bucket shops accepted customer orders and funds but did not execute
the orders on any exchange. Rather, they simply bet the customer would lose
and kept the customer's funds in such an event. If the customers won too
much, the bucket shop would fold its operations and move to a new location.
JOHN HILL, JR., GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION 37-39 (1904). The Supreme
Court had already provided an effective means for stopping the bucket shops,
i.e., shutting off the quotations from the legitimate exchanges on which the
bucket shop operators relied for their trading. See Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1905) (upholding cutting off quota-
tions to the operations of C.C. Christie, the "Bucket Shop King").
93. Price manipulations were occurring on a monthly basis on the Chicago
Board of Trade. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices - The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991) [hereinafter
Markham, Manipulation]. The traders conducting manipulations became
legends. See Leon Kendal, The Chicago Board of Trade and the Federal Gov-
ernment: A Study in their Relationship, 1848 to 1952, at 56 (Masters Thesis,
Ind. U. School of Bus. 1956) (on file with author) ("The feats of Leiter, Armour,
Patten, and others in cornering the markets are legends of American com-
merce.").
94. GEORGE WRIGHT HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED
COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 372 (1932). The Grain Futures
Administration was subject to oversight by a commission composed of the
Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Attorney Gen-
eral. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 6, 42 Stat. 998, 1001 (1922).
95. By 1932, wheat prices were at a three-hundred-year low, and a bushel
of corn cost less than a pack of chewing gum. Wheat's Plunge to a 300 Year
Low, THE LITERARY DIGEST, Nov. 12, 1932, at 6.
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markets.96 History intervened to assure that such regulation
would be separately conducted. The agricultural committees in
Congress had jurisdiction over the commodity exchanges, while
the banking committees controlled securities matters. Neither
would cede authority to the other. The agricultural committees
acted somewhat more slowly than the banking committees and
were unable to pass legislation until 1936. The result, the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,"7 continued much of the legis-
lative approach of the Grain Futures Act. The name of the
Grain Futures Administration was changed to the Commodity
Exchange Authority, which was still subject to oversight by the
same three cabinet officials ("Commodity Exchange Commis-
sion")." The analogue to the securities broker-dealer in the
commodity futures business is the futures commission mer-
chant ("FCM"). These firms were required to register as such
with the government under the Commodity Exchange Act99 and
to segregate customer funds into trust accounts."' Option trad-
ing was prohibited on regulated commodities. 1'
Manipulation of commodity prices was also prohibited - but
that term was not defined in the Commodity Exchange Act of
1936, and the government proved unable to stop such prac-
96. The President's message stated that:
It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in securities and commodi-
ties are necessary and of definite value to our commercial and agri-
cultural life. Nevertheless, it should be our national policy to restrict,
as far as possible, the use of these exchanges for purely speculative
operations.
I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation
providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the opera-
tions of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for the pro-
tection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it
may be possible for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and de-
structive speculation.
H.R. REP. No. 74-421, at 2 (19J5) (emphasis added).
97. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
98. JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND
ITS REGULATION 27 (1987) [hereinafter MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING].
99. 7 U.S.C. § 6f(a) (2000).
100. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1990).
101. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2000).
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tices.02 Scandals in commodity options on unregulated com-
modities in the early 1970s raised concern in Congress,"°3 and
the incredible inflation in commodity prices during that period
also led to calls for additional legislation." It came in the form
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,"5
which carried forward the provisions of the Commodity Ex-
change Act and created the CFTC. The agency was given exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the trading of commodity futures and
commodity options on all commodities. ' Moreover, the CFTC
was given increased enforcement powers, 107 and the regulatory
reach of the Commodity Exchange Act was expanded to include
commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and as-
sociated persons of futures commission merchants."8
III. DISTINCTIVE REGULATION DEVELOPS BETWEEN SECURITIES
AND FUTURES
During the first forty years of its existence, the SEC found lit-
tle reason to compete with the Commodity Exchange Authority
("CEA"), as commodity futures and securities operated more or
less independently. Indeed, while considering the adoption of
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Congress found that
some large speculators had transferred their manipulative ac-
tivities from the stock markets to the grain exchanges in order
to escape regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.2"9 SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas, therefore, sought
102. See Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 313-23 (describing
unsuccessful government actions against manipulative activities in the fu-
tures markets).
103. See infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
104. See id.
105. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
107. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
108. 7 U.S.C. § 6k (2000) (associated person registration requirement); 7
U.S.C. § 6n (2000) (commodity trading advisor and pool operator registration
requirement).
109. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at
25. At least one large and vicious speculator crossed over the other way, i.e.,
from the commodity exchanges to the stock markets during the 1920s. This
individual, Arthur Cutten, was involved in numerous commodity manipula-
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further regulation of grain speculators, especially those dealing
in puts and calls."' President Roosevelt responded by asking
his Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, to take action
against the commodity exchanges.' Wallace refused to do so,
viewing the SEC's concern as mere pretense, cloaking a power
grab by the very ambitious Douglas."
The regulatory structures governing securities and commod-
ity futures were thus allowed to develop separately and distinc-
tively. While the cornerstone of SEC regulation is full disclo-
sure to the public in securities offerings, there is no comparable
concept in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. The SEC was
also given authority to enforce margin requirements for securi-
ties set by the Federal Reserve Board, a device Congress con-
cluded would curb speculation and avoid the diversion of scarce
credit into such activities."' The CEA, on the other hand, pos-
sessed no such authority and had informed Congress during the
hearings on the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 that such
authority was not needed. Rather, the CEA wanted to impose
limits on the amount of trading that could be conducted by the
large speculators, who at the time were the principal perpetra-
tors of market manipulations."' Such authority was granted by
Congress in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. " ' The SEC
tions before moving his activities and operating on an even grander scale in
the securities markets. Id. at 26.
110. See 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at
143.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 225.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2000). Margin requirements are set under Federal
Reserve Board Rules, the most prominent of which is Regulation T. Credit by
Brokers and Dealers, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.18 (2002). The Federal Reserve
Board changed margin requirements some twenty-five times after the adop-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to squelch speculation in
the case of increases or to ease access to the market during downturns. To-
day, most actively traded stock is subject to a margin requirement of 50%. 23
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, §§ 3.01-3.02.
114. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commod-
ity Futures Industry - History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 69-71, 71
n.60 (1991) [hereinafter Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin].
115. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a(c) (2000) (authorizing position limits for speculators
and exempting "bona fide" hedging from their application). See also generally
United States v. Cohen, 448 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1971) (speculative limit viola-
tions); Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1970); Goodman v. Benson, 286
F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1961).
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had no comparable power. Although the CEA changed its posi-
tion not long afterward and sought authority to control margins
as well - after its position limits proved ineffective in curbing
price rises in commodity markets - Congress refused to grant
the CEA this power.16 Margins on futures were considered a
device to protect the exchanges and futures commission mer-
chants from customer defaults, rather than a credit allocation
issue or a means to control speculation.'7 Congress thought
that the commodity exchanges were in a better position than
the government to assure that margin levels were adequate for
their protection."'
Although both agencies had antifraud provisions to adminis-
ter, the Commodity Exchange Act provision was more narrowly
focused and was never given the expansive interpretation ap-
plied to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."'
That section was the most broadly applied of the antifraud pro-
visions administered by the SEC; it was pursuant to that sec-
tion that the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5.'20 The rule applies to all
securities transactions, and the SEC has used this authority to
create entire regulatory programs, the most famous being its
insider trading prosecutions."' Demonstrating the flexibility of
Rule 10b-5, the SEC's insider trading program was not begun
until over a quarter of a century after the agency was created,
and almost twenty years after the adoption of the rule.' Al-
116. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 71-80.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 76. This did not stop the government from jawboning and
threatening the commodity exchanges with more regulation if they did not
increase margins during periods of major price increases. Id. at 80.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
120. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2002).
121. 2 HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 12.3[2] (describing adoption and
expansion of the application of Rule 10b-5). The SEC has not been shy in
creating substantive regulation through litigation in other areas, such as
questionable payments to foreign government officials in order to obtain busi-
ness. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 153-159 (1982).
122. Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 1942. Employment of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). The SEC did not prosecute
insider trading under this rule until 1961. See In the Matter of Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Even then, Rule 10b-5 did not receive much at-
tention for insider trading purposes for another seven years, when it was
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though sometimes likened to Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act
of 1936 '23 was limited to specific fraudulent practices made in
connection with futures traded on contract markets. 2 4 There
was no interest by commodity regulators in creating an insider
trading program in the futures industry.125
Additional disparities existed in the two regulatory schemes.
A cornerstone of SEC broker-dealer regulation became the
suitability requirement, i.e., a broker-dealer may not recom-
mend securities to a customer that are unsuitable in light of the
customer's own particular financial circumstances and objec-
tives "' - a doctrine that the SEC created out of whole cloth.'27
given its most expansive interpretation in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
123. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2000).
124. The Supreme Court has casually compared Section 4b in the Commod-
ity Exchange Act with Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982). But in fact, the language and application of Section 4b has been more
narrowly focused, i.e., it applies only to commodity futures trading on contract
markets. See 13 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD,
MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS §§ 1.01-1.08 (2001) [hereinafter MARKHAM,
FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS] (describing judicial decisions inter-
preting Section 4b). The CFTC did adopt antifraud rules for other products
such as commodity options (17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (2002)), foreign futures contracts,
(17 C.F.R. § 30.9 (2002)), and leverage contracts, Fraud in Connection with
Certain Transaction in Silver or Gold Bullion or Bulk Coins, or Other Com-
modities, 17 C.F.R. § 31.3 (2002). The CFTC had tried to model its commodity
options rule after SEC Rule 10b-5, but was forced to retreat in the face of in-
dustry opposition. The CFTC did keep Rule 10b-5 language in its antifraud
rule for leverage contracts. 13 MARKHAM, FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER
CLAIMS, supra, § 2.08.
125. See discussion infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in
Securities Transactions, 54 Bus. LAw. 1557 (1999) (describing suitability doc-
trine).
127. The suitability doctrine was borrowed from the NYSE's "know your
customer" rule. The exchange rule sought to protect member firms from un-
scrupulous "freeriding" customers that bought stock and paid only if the stock
price increased. The SEC turned that concept on its head and imposed the
suitability obligation on broker-dealers as a customer protection measure.
This was done under the SEC's "shingle" theory, which posits that, in hanging
out its shingle, a broker-dealer represents to the public that the broker-dealer
is a professional and customers may rely on that expertise for suitable rec-
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The CEA, on the other hand, invented no comparable regula-
tory concept. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 prohibited
over-the-counter dealings in commodity futures; the contract
markets were given a monopoly on such transactions, at least
for the "regulated" commodities.' 8 The SEC, in contrast, regu-
lated a broad-based over-the-counter market'29 and imposed af-
firmative obligations on market makers and exchange special-
ists to make a "fair and orderly" market, i.e., a market that was
not volatile.'30 No such requirement was imposed on the floor
traders on the commodity exchanges. Instead, trading was con-
ducted in an auction-style open outcry system in which traders
could participate, or not, as they chose.'3'
SEC regulation was paternalistic in other ways. It imposed a
duty of supervision on broker-dealers that required them to af-
firmatively supervise their employees with a view toward pre-
venting violations. 32 The CEA, in contrast, imposed no such ob-
ligation on futures commission merchants.' 3  However, the CEA
ommendations. See generally 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 9.01
(describing basis of suitability doctrine).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). See generally Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity
Exchange Monopoly - Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977 (1991)
[hereinafter Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly] (describing ill
effects of the commodity exchange trading requirement).
129. This is not to suggest that the SEC was without sin. It allowed the
NYSE to enforce a rule against its members that prohibited trading of listed
stocks except through the exchange. This gave rise to the "third" and "fourth"
markets in listed stocks by non-members. The SEC tried to hack away at the
rule by prohibiting its application to trading on other exchanges and then to
newly listed securities. Finally, the NYSE capitulated and repealed the rule
in 1999. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 332.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (2000). See Shultz v. SEC, 614 F.2d 561, 563-64
(7th Cir. 1980) (describing market-making obligations). The Nasdaq market
uses competitive market makers, while the stock exchanges use the specialist,
but both have affirmative market-stabilizing obligations. 23A MARKHAM &
HAZEN, supra note 35, § 10.01 (describing market making obligations).
131. See Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 363-76 (comparing
market-making obligations on commodity and security exchanges). Block
positioning was encouraged in the securities industry, but was prohibited in
the futures markets. Id. at 374.
132. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer
Supervision: A Troublesome Area, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 527 (1994) (describ-
ing supervisory duty).
133. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 did impose liability on futures
commission merchants for the acts of their agents. 7 U.S.C. § 2a (2000).
There was no comparable provision in the federal securities laws, but the SEC
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did have a large trader reporting system, a power that the SEC
did not receive until 1990."' The CEA required large traders to
file a report disclosing the identity of the trader and any affili-
ates or entities under common control. The size of the trader's
position was then monitored by the CEA to assure that the
trader posed no danger to the market.'35
Though the securities and commodity futures regulatory
schemes differed, no one really noticed before the 1970s. The
product mix of the two industries was such that, aside from
some mobile speculators, there was little overlap between com-
modity and futures trading.'36 The situation began to change
dramatically as inflation heated the economy during the Viet-
nam War.'37 The resulting price hikes turned investors' atten-
tion toward inflation hedges such as gold and silver. The re-
moval of restrictions on trading allowed these metals to be the
subject of commodity futures trading. Similarly, President
Nixon's removal of the U.S. from the gold standard and out of
the International Monetary Fund's fixed rate currency regime
claimed that such liability was appropriate even without authorizing legisla-
tion. Compare Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990)
(overruling en banc an earlier decision that had rejected respondeat superior
liability) and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (rejecting agency
liability), with, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (ap-
plying respondeat superior liability). The SEC did have the authority to sanc-
tion controlling persons. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2000). That
power was not added to the Commodity Exchange Act until 1982. 7 U.S.C §
13c(b) (2000).
134. This authority was given to the SEC by the Market Reform Act of 1990,
§ 3, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)). The
SEC proposed a rule implementing this authority. See Large Trader Report-
ing System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,608, 59 Fed. Reg. 7917 (Feb. 17,
1994). However, it has not been adopted.
135. See generally In the Matter of International Futures Corp., Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 27,993 (C.F.T.C. 2000) describing prior violations of CEA
large trader reporting requirements), affd, without opinion, Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 559 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1977).
136. Broker-dealers engaging in securities activities often had separate
departments that conducted commodity futures trading for customers. This
required dual registration under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
137. The inflation that occurred in the 1970s led to many "hard" money
investment programs that would inflate with the economy. See 3 MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 61 (describing these pro-
grams).
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led to fluctuating exchange rates that provided a basis for cur-
rency trading."8
Price volatility also led the commodity exchanges to consider
commodity futures trading on interest rates and stock prices. '
A committee of the Chicago Board of Trade began to explore
whether commodity futures trading principles could be applied
to stocks. The result was the CBOE.' ° Prior to the creation of
the CBOE, stock options were sold only on a limited basis in the
over-the-counter market. The CBOE introduced a commodity
futures concept of trading standardized options contracts on an
exchange floor. This standardization, along with the introduc-
tion of a clearing house, the Options Clearing Corporation
("OCC"), created a secondary market in options. The CBOE
trading floor borrowed from both the securities and commodity
exchanges. Instead of a specialist, competing market makers
were used to create liquidity in an open outcry system like that
on the commodity exchanges.'
The SEC asserted regulatory control over the CBOE under
the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, '142 and also
became involved in the regulation of over-the-counter commod-
ity options. A loophole in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936
allowed options trading on "unregulated" commodities, such as
sugar, coffee, and silver. Harold Goldstein, a twenty-six year
old commodity trader discovered this and built one of the larg-
est brokerage firms almost overnight through the sale of "na-
ked" options, not backed by anything other than the dubious
credit of Goldstein's firm, Goldstein, Samuelson. However, in-
creasing prices resulted in customer gains that Goldstein could
not cover. The SEC shut down his and similar options firms by
138. See generally LEO MELAMED & BOB TAMARKIN, ESCAPE TO THE FUTURES
(1996) (describing creation of futures markets on currency).
139. For a description of these events, see 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY
OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 42-43.
140. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1140 n.2
(7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
141. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 43, at 743-45 (describing the
CBOE trading system).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (2000). A court later noted that, if the CFTC had
been in existence when the CBOE was created, the CFTC, rather than the.
SEC, would have had jurisdiction. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 677
F.2d at 1140 n.2.
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claiming that these contracts were securities.4 State securities
administrators aided the SEC in these efforts, and Goldstein
was finally jailed.'
The Goldstein, Samuelson debacle caused concern in Con-
gress, as did the large jump in commodity prices during this
period.' 5 Congressional hearings found fault with the CEA's
deference to the commodity exchanges, 4 ' and Congress con-
cluded that new legislation was needed to close the regulatory
gap in the Commodity Exchange Act that had allowed Gold-
stein, Samuelson to operate. Congress thought that all com-
modity options and futures trading should be subject to regula-
tion, "'47 and thus the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974 ("CFTCA") created the CFTC4. and brought all
commodity futures and options trading under a "single regula-
tory umbrella."9 The CFTC was "patterned" after the SEC and
was granted strengthened enforcement powers,'50 including au-
143. See, eg., SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.
1977); SEC v. American Commodity Options Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th
Cir. 1976).
144. See generally Robert C. Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options,
1978 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1978) (describing Goldstein's operations and resulting
regulation); Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Under The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 710, 721 n.8 (1975) (describing losses).
145. Soybean prices increased by over $8 per bushel in one five-month pe-
riod. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at
56-57. A large sale of grain to the Soviet Union caused a spike in wheat
prices and led to claims that the Soviets and various grain companies had
profited on those transactions by advance purchases on the futures markets
- the "Great Grain Robbery." DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 12-121
(1979) (observing that the grain robbery was a world-changing economic
event).
146. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at
60-65.
147. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 regulated futures trading only
on specified commodities. Additional commodities were added to that list over
the years, but such ad hoc amendments could not keep pace with the contin-
ual expansion of futures trading to other commodities.
148. Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4).
149. H.R. REP. No. 93-975 at 42 (1974).
150. 120 CONG. REC. 30467 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft). The CFTC was to
be comparable to the SEC in its regulatory role. See generally S. REP. No. 93-
1131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843; 120 CONG. REC. 10741
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Adams).
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thority to seek injunctive relief,5' a favorite weapon employed
by the SEC."' Self-regulation by the commodity exchanges was
also strengthened.'53 The National Futures Association was
later created to act as an analogue to the NASD.
The CFTCA further gave the CFTC certain authority that the
SEC did not possess: the CFTC could impose civil penalties of
up to $100,000 per violation 4 (a power that the SEC did not
receive until 1984),' bar violators from trading on contract
markets"' (a power that the SEC was not given), and grant
reparations to investors injured by violations committed by reg-
istered persons (again, this was not a power granted to the
SEC). 157
There were other differences in regulation between the two
agencies. Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection
Act ("SIPA") in 1970,58 after the securities industry nearly col-
151. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2000). The CEA had
sought such authority in 1968, but the authorizing legislation was blocked in
Congress by the commodity exchanges. Jerry W. Markham, Injunctive Ac-
tions under the Commodity Exchange Act, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 504,
at B-1 (May 23, 1979).
152. See generally Harvey L. Pitt and Jerry W. Markham, SEC Civil Injunc-
tive Actions: A Reply, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 955 (1973) (describing importance of
injunctive actions in SEC enforcement program). Professor Karmel has
charged that the SEC has used its injunctive actions, which often end in con-
sent decrees, to create substantive regulation. See generally KARMEL, supra
note 121. Interestingly, the CFTC rarely brings injunctive actions and in-
stead prefers to initiate administrative disciplinary proceedings.
153. Jerry W. Markham & John M. Schobel, Self-Regulation Under the
Commodity Exchange Act - Can the CFTC Make It Work?, Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 368 (Special Supp. Sept. 1, 1976).
154. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
155. The SEC was given the power to seek civil penalties for insider trading
by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
156. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
157. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). See generally William R. Schief & Jerry W.
Markham, The Nation's "Commodity Cops" - Efforts by the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission to Enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 34 Bus.
LAw. 19 (1978) (describing CFTC enforcement powers and actions); Jerry W.
Markham, The Seventh Amendment and CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68
IOWA L. REV. 87 (1982) (describing CFTC reparations proceedings).
158. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat.
1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78aaa-78111 (2000)). See also
sources cited supra note 36; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412 (1975) (describing this statute).
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lapsed during the "paperwork crisis" at the end of the 1970s.'59
The statute provided insurance to securities customers (now
$500,000, of which up to $100,000 may be in cash) in the event
of a broker-dealer insolvency. '° The CFTCA also directed the
CFTC to consider whether such legislation was needed in the
futures industry.6 ' The resulting CFTC study compared loss
ratios of firms under government insurance programs with the
loss ratios of commodity futures customers. The loss ratios for
futures commission merchant customers were found to be sub-
stantially lower than insured firms, leading the CFTC to con-
clude that insurance was unnecessary. '
This is a marked difference in competing regulatory ap-
proaches. Insurance creates a moral hazard that the firm being
insured will attract funds at low cost from investors on the
strength of the government's credit and then use those funds for
high return, high risk ventures. The savings and loan debacle
of the 1980s is a good example of a gluttonous feast on insured
funds."3 The futures industry, in contrast, uses market disci-
pline to protect customers, which seems an unlikely undertak-
ing when the nature of futures trading is considered. Commod-
ity futures contracts are highly leveraged. The low margin re-
quirements set by the exchanges are only a very small percent
of the notional amount at risk.1" Small moves mean large
159. NYSE firms were choking on daily trading volume averaging 16 million
shares at the end of the 1960s. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.,
supra note 15, at 361. Today, the NYSE is able to handle daily volume of 2.8
billion shares without a hiccup. Adam Shell, Have Stocks Finally Hit Bot-
tom?, USA TODAY, July 25, 2002, at lB. During the "paperwork crisis," some
160 NYSE firms failed, and the exchange exhausted the trust fund it had used
to indemnify customers in failed firms. SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 452-53.
160. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2000).
161. Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4).
162. Report to the Congress Concerning Commodity Futures Account Insur-
ance, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,235 (Nov. 1, 1976).
163. See generally BANKING SCANDALS: THE S & Ls AND BCCI (Robert Emmet
Long ed., 1993) (describing the looting that went on in the savings and loan
industry); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 970 (1992) (describing the looting that went on at Columbia Savings &
Loan Association).
164. SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir.
1977).
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losses to at least half of the market participants.'' Futures con-
tracts are also selected on the basis of a high degree of price
volatility, and speculation is encouraged.' Yet, despite the lev-
erage (and attendant risk) and the large element of speculation
present, there are fewer customer losses due to the bankruptcy
of a financial intermediary than in the insured industries that
have less risk, volatility, and speculation. 7
The answer lies in the way margin trading is regulated in the
futures industry. The exchanges set margin for the protection
of their clearing houses and positions are marked to market
daily. Losses must be recognized through variation margin
payments that must be made before the firm can trade the next
day. Futures commission merchants are thus forced to recog-
nize customer losses each day. Losses cannot be put off in the
hope of a market recovery;'68 nor can they accumulate. 9 The
165. Futures trading is a zero-sum game. For each buyer, there is a seller.
A market move one way or the other will mean a gain to one side and a loss to
the other. Board of Trade v. CFTC, 724 F. Supp. 548, 555 n.11 (N.D. Ill.
1989). The loss may be offset by another risk, however, as in the case of a
hedger. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, n.11 (1982) (describing hedging with commodity futures).
166. Speculation provides price information and liquidity for hedgers offset-
ting commercial risks through the futures markets. Curran, 456 U.S. at 358-
60.
167. From 1970 to at least 1996, no failure of member of a major commodity
futures exchange resulted in a loss of customer funds. Jerry W. Markham,
The CFTC Net Capital Rule - Should a More Risk-Based Approach be
Adopted?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1093 (1996) [hereinafter Markham, The
CFTC Net Capital Rule].
168. As noted by one exchange official:
This unique feature is a primary factor which enables commodity
markets to boast an incredibly good record in the area of insolvencies.
Every firm must be monetarily "even" with the commodity prices of
the previous day. If a firm's net commitment shows a net loss on the
basis of the previous settlement prices, it pays the resultant amount
to the exchange clearinghouse. If a firm's net commitment shows a
profit, it collects the resultant amount from the clearinghouse. This
process is a daily procedure.
Review of the Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong. 192 (1973)
(statement of Leo Melamed, Secretary of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change).
169. This is not to say that there have been no failures of futures commis-
sion merchants. Large customer losses have occurred as the result of looting
of customer accounts to pay margins for accounts in deficit. Three of the more
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securities industry, on the other hand, had no comparable mar-
ket discipline. Transactions were settled on a T+5 basis, i.e.,
settlement was not made until five days after the execution of
the trade. This left plenty of time for losses to mount or for cus-
tomers to engage in reckless conduct to make up for losses. The
SEC has since imposed a T+3 requirement on settlement, but
this is still three days more than is required in the futures in-
dustry.'7
At the time the CFTC was created, the SEC was also in the
midst of defending an expansive interpretation of its insider
trading program under Rule 10b-5. The CFTC later conducted
a study to determine whether a similar rule was needed in the
futures industry,'"' but concluded it was not appropriate to im-
pose such a regulation on futures traders.' 2 Many participants
highly publicized of those failures occurred in the early 1980s: Incomco, Inc.;
Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers; and Volume Investors. The latter fail-
ure led the CFTC staff to reconsider whether account insurance was needed,
but no action was taken. At the time, customer losses from bankrupt futures
commission merchants were averaging only about $2 million per year. 23
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 4.08. The tenth largest futures commis-
sion merchant failed in 1990. See In re Stotler & Co., 144 B.R. 385, 386 (N.D
Ill. 1992) (describing size of bankruptcy). That firm, Stotler & Co., was
headed by the Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade. The parent company
had moved several millions of dollars out of the futures commission merchant
before it failed. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42,
at 162-63. Customer losses, however, appear to have been minimal. See In re
Stotler, 144 B.R. at 386.
170. See generally Report of the Backmann Task Force on Clearance and
Settlement Reform in U.S. Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No.
30,802, 51 S.E.C. Docket 1,073 (June 15, 1992) (describing need for reducing
settlement period); Securities Transactions Settlement, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-33,023, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,891 (Oct. 13, 1993) (adopting T+3 require-
ment). An SEC chairman subsequently suggested that T+1 or even same day
settlement should be the securities industry goal. SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt, Speeding Up Settlement; The Next Frontier, Address Before a Sympo-
sium on Risk Reduction and Payments, Clearance and Settlement Systems,
New York, NY, Jan. 26, 1996.
171. CFTC, A Study of the Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading by
Persons Possessing Material Nonpublic Information, submitted to the House
Committee on Agriculture and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry Pursuant to Section 23(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as
Amended (Sept. 1984) (on file with author) [hereinafter CFTC, Study of the
Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading].
172. Id. The author leaves for others to resolve the debate whether insider
trading in securities is good or bad. See Henry G. Manne, Options? Nah. Try
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in the futures markets had superior access to information and
traders on exchange floors had time and place advantages for
the use of information. The CFTC believed that it was neither
practical nor desirable to mandate that traders have equal ac-
cess to information, as required by the SEC.173
The CFTC did seek to adopt some regulatory requirements
that would have more closely conformed its regulatory structure
to that of the SEC, largely due to the fact that several newly
arrived staff members at the CFTC had formerly served on the
SEC staff.'74 One SEC-style proposal enacted was a net capital
rule. ' The SEC had adopted its Uniform Net Capital Rule in
the aftermath of the paperwork crisis."6 Since the stock ex-
changes had failed to enforce their capital rules during the pa-
perwork crisis,'77 the SEC concluded that a more stringent fed-
Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at A8 (advocating using inside
information as a form of compensation and asserting that: "Currently, the
SEC sees its job as regulating the entire market for information. This is
madness.").
173. The CFTC viewed most information used for futures trading to be
"market" information that, at least in theory, was accessible to everyone, even
if not on an equal basis. The CFTC did express concern regarding abuses of
information obtained by the exchanges in confidence that could be traded for a
profit. The CFTC adopted a rule to guard against such abuses (17 C.F.R. §
1.59 (2002)), and the Commodity Exchange Act was later amended to include
such a prohibition. See H.R. REP. No. 102-978, at 23 (1992) (discussing the
amendment). The CFTC initially rejected the "misappropriation" theory that
the SEC was pushing in the securities industry. Compare, CFTC, Study of the
Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading, supra note 171, at 57, with,
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (endorsing SEC misappropria-
tion theory). The CFTC, however, later brought a case against two traders
who were misappropriating information concerning the trading plans of a
large firm that had market effect. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Kelly, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 27,465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
174. See MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra
note 98, at 86 (describing staff members that drafted CFTC net capital rule).
(The author must confess to being one of these staff members.)
175. Minimum Financial Requirements for Futures Commission Merchants
and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2002).
176. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1 (2002). Government insurance programs inevitably lead to perva-
sive and intrusive, as well as very expensive and complex, regulation - all of
which is justified as necessary to protect the insurance fund because market
discipline has been removed.
177. The Chairman of the NYSE stated that another one hundred exchange
member firms would have been put out of business if the exchange had
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eral rule was needed to protect customers and the SIPA insur-
ance fund.178 The futures industry had no paperwork crisis -
its overnight settlement requirement and paperless trading as-
sured that result.179 Nevertheless, the newly arrived SEC staff
members were fresh from their exposure to the SEC Uniform
Net Capital Rule, and believed such a requirement was
needed.18" Still, the CFTC net capital rule does not appear to
have had much effect in preventing insolvencies by futures
commission merchants. If anything, the traditionally low rate
of failures actually increased.' The CFTC net capital rule is
also flawed and out of date in its risk measurement criteria, '
but still remains on the books.
The CFTC staff also tried to borrow wholesale from the SEC's
rulebook'83 by proposing a set of customer protection rules.'84
strictly enforced its capital rule during the paperwork crisis. 2 MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 364. In contrast, the Chi-
cago Board of Trade suspended the firm of Hayden, Stone for failing to meet
its capital requirements. The NYSE then pressured the Board of Trade to
remove the suspension in order to prevent a failure of the firm, which was also
a member of the NYSE. Hayden, Stone continued to encounter difficulties.
Id. at 363.
178. The SEC's capital rule did not apply to exchange member firms until
the adoption of its Uniform Net Capital Rule in 1975. Under the old rule,
stock exchange member firms were subject to capital requirements imposed
by the exchanges. 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 5.02. For a de-
scription of the background and reasons for the adoption of the Uniform Net
Capital Rule, see generally SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES
OF BROKER-DEALERS, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971).
179. In 1968, Congress added the authority to adopt capital rules to the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 due to concern that irresponsible firms were
entering the business. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, amended by 82
Stat. 26 (1968). See generally S. REP. No. 90-947 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673.
180. See generally Proposed Financial Reporting Requirements for Futures
Commission Merchants, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,220 (Oct. 15, 1976)
(describing proposed CFTC net capital rule).
181. See supra note 169 (describing failures by futures commission mer-
chants on the CFTC's watch).
182. See Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule, supra note 167, at 1091
(describing flaws in CFTC net capital rule).
183. Minimum Financial Requirements for Futures Commission Merchants
and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2002). There has been some cross-
fertilization from the CFTC to the SEC. As another measure to protect the
SIPA insurance fund, the SEC was directed by Congress to adopt rules for the
protection of customer funds. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3)(A) (2000). The SEC
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Among other things, the proposals included a rule imposing a
supervision requirement like that employed by the SEC. The
rule was adopted, albeit in a more simplified form.' A proposal
to adopt a suitability requirement did not fare as well" - it set
off a firestorm of controversy and the rule was never adopted.' 1
adopted its "Customer Protection Rule" in response. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3
(2002). This rule requires customer funds held by broker-dealers to be kept in
special bank accounts held for the benefit of customers. Box counts of cus-
tomer funds and securities are also required. Id. The rule was adopted in the
wake of the paperwork crisis and after criticism was raised that customer free
credit balances were being used to fund the operations of broker-dealers, effec-
tively an interest-free loan. 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 4.03.
The SEC Customer Protection Rule was directly analogous to the requirement
in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 on segregation of customer funds and
securities into special bank accounts. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (2000). See also Cus-
tomer Funds to be Segregated and Separately Accounted For, 17 C.F.R. § 1.20
(2002) (regulation implementing segregation requirements).
The SEC stated that it was hopeful that its Customer Protection Rule
would obviate the need for its net capital rule. SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, STUDY ON THE FINANCING AND REGULATORY CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY 7 n.17 (Jan. 23, 1985) (on file with author). Government
being what it is, that never came to pass.
184. See generally Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Con-
duct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742 (1977).
185. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2002). See generally Adoption of Customer Protec-
tion Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886 (1978). (As the result of much industry oppo-
sition, the proposed supervisory rule was simplified before adoption.)
186. Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Com-
modity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,743 (1977).
187. The CFTC asserted that such a requirement was implied in the Com-
modity Exchange Act of 1936, and, therefore, a rule was not needed. Adoption
of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (1978). After some
flip-flopping, the CFTC later held in its reparations proceedings that there is
no suitability requirement in the act. Phacelli v. Conticommodity Services,
Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,345 (C.F.T.C. 1984). The courts agreed
with that interpretation. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793
F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986).
The CFTC had also proposed a churning rule that would have prohib-
ited brokers from excessively trading customer accounts they controlled. Pro-
tection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trad-
ing Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,745 (1977). This proposal was also
dropped. Like the suitability proposal, the CFTC claimed that such a re-
quirement was already implied in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.
Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (1978).
Unlike the suitability rule, the CFTC later held that the CEA antifraud provi-
sion implied a churning prohibition. See, eg., In re Lincolnwood Commodi-
ties, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,986 (C.F.T.C. 1984).
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Instead, the CFTC adopted a one-page risk disclosure state-
ment that advised customers of the risks of trading commodity
futures, and recommended that customers should themselves
consider whether commodity futures trading was suitable in
light of their particular circumstances and financial resources. '
Customers were required to sign the statement and confirm
that they had read and understood the risks. '89 This was visibly
different from the paternalistic approach of the SEC - the
CFTC was requiring individuals to take responsibility for their
own investment decisions. Regulatory competition was indeed
influencing the manner in which the two industries would be
regulated. This competition would also lead to much strife.
IV. REGULATORY BATTLES BETWEEN CFTC AND SEC
The SEC was not new to regulatory competition when the
CFTC arrived, and had just recently engaged in an extended
quarrel with the banking regulators over which it should have
been given authority to regulate securities clearing and settle-
ment functions conducted by banks.'" That slanging match
ended in a compromise whereby regulatory authority over
banks engaging in clearing and settlement was given to the
bank regulatory authorities, while the SEC regulated all oth-
ers."8' In another act of aggression, the SEC adopted a rule that
would have subjected banks engaging in securities activities to
registration as broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. However, a circuit court struck down the rule as
being outside the SEC's jurisdiction. 2 Nonetheless, the SEC
continued to seek to regulate banks through the back door of
188. Distribution of "Risk Disclosure Statement" by Futures Commission
Merchants and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (2002).
189. Id.
190. The SEC claimed before Congress that it had greater enforcement
powers than the bank regulators and thus should be given sole jurisdiction
over all clearing and settlement activities, including those by banks. The
banks took umbrage and fought back in Congress with their own expansive
claims of regulatory authority. See 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, §
8.02.
191. Id. A similar compromise was reached in 1985 over the regulation of
dealers in government securities. 3 HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 14.7
(describing Government Securities Act of 1986).
192. American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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disclosure, i.e., most large banks are public companies that
must report to the SEC. '93
The SEC soon found itself on the defensive as bank regulators
took an increasingly liberal view of which activities banks could
engage in under the Glass-Steagall Act. "4 The securities indus-
try retaliated through the courts, with mixed success. Fur-
thermore, competition between the CFTC and the SEC was an-
other challenge that began almost immediately after the adop-
tion of the CFTCA. The decision of the CFTC to approve com-
modity futures trading on Government National Mortgage As-
sociation ("GNMA") certificates set off an explosion at the SEC.
The SEC contended that such contracts were the equivalent of
"when issued" GNMAs that were already regulated by the SEC.
This resulted in an exchange of acrimonious correspondence
between the two agencies. At the end of the day, the SEC lost
the battle and GNMA futures continued to trade.'95 Undaunted,
the CFTC also approved a futures contract on treasury bills on
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1976.196 The SEC, however,
had a long memory and, as will be seen, would retaliate against
the CFTC.'97
In the meantime, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
CFTC over commodity options'99 removed the regulatory con-
trols established by the SEC and state securities administrators
over commodity option dealers.'9 The results were a quick re-
turn of fly-by-night commodity option firms, numerous scan-
dals, and widespread fraud. The situation was not alleviated
193. Raphael Soifer, U.S. Regulator Applies the Pressure, 151 BANKER, Issue
No. 902, Apr. 1, 2001.
194. See generally MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS
ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (1993) (describing expan-
sion of bank activities).
195. See MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note
98, at 81-83 (describing this dispute).
196. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 81.
197. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
198. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (2000).
199. See John M. Schobel, Jr. & Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Options -
A New Industry or Another Debacle?, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1-20 (Special
Supp. Apr. 7, 1976) (describing return of fly-by-night commodity options
firms).
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until the CFTC suspended the trading of commodity options,"
but the SEC used the scandals as the basis for an unsuccessful
attempt to wrest jurisdiction from the CFTC during the latter's
reauthorization hearings in 1978, °' seeking regulatory author-
ity on all instruments involving securities. The Treasury De-
partment also desired a role where treasury securities were in-
volved. Congress, however, refused to entertain these demands
and merely directed the CFTC to consult with the SEC and the
banking regulators where instruments they regulated were the
subject of commodity futures or options trading."°'
Another threat to the SEC was the decision by the CFTC to
approve futures trading on stock indexes. 3 These contracts
200. 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1978). Several of these firms grew quickly and were
selling options on a national basis to unsophisticated customers; fraud was
widespread. The CFTC also discovered that one of the larger of these firms
was owned and operated by a felon who had escaped from prison. Kelley v.
Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Mich. 1983). At the time it suspended options
trading, the CFTC was devoting a large amount of its resources to options
problems. See Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285
Before the House Subcomm. On Conservation and Credit of the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 95th Cong. 39 (1978) (statement of William Bagley, CFTC
Chairman, describing resources expended by CFTC on options problems). The
CFTC allowed some options trading to continue, including options entered
into by commercial firms. Exemptions, 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (2002). The CFTC
also later allowed commodity options trading to be conducted on commodity
exchanges, which provided a regulatory structure for excluding the fly-by-
night firms that led to the retail over-the-counter options suspension. Regula-
tion of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,500
(1981).
201. See MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note
98, at 99-100 (describing jurisdictional fight). The SEC had regulatory prob-
lems of its own with respect to exchange traded stock options. As the result of
abuses, the SEC suspended further expansion of such trading and conducted
an extended study of the stock options market. After some reforms, the SEC
allowed trading to continue. See generally REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 96TH CONG. (Comm.
Print 1978) (describing abuses).
202. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at
99-100
203. The Kansas City Board of Trade inaugurated the trading of index fu-
tures in 1982. Chicago Board of Options Exch., Inc. v. Board of Trade, 459
U.S. 1026 (1982); Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1171 n.ll (7th Cir.),
vacated as moot sub. nom. See also Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity
Exch. Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing stock index futures); Jerry
W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Washington Watch - Stock Index Futures, 6
CORP. L. REv. 59 (1982) (same).
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were almost immediately popular and spread to other commod-
ity exchanges. The SEC retaliated by approving the trading of
options on GNMA certificates on the CBOE. The commodity
exchanges challenged this action in court and won before the
Seventh Circuit." By this point, the SEC realized that it was
fighting a losing battle in trying to encroach on the CFTC's ju-
risdiction; it had learned that it could not win a confrontation in
Congress over this matter. The futures industry lobby was
simply too strong, and the agricultural committees were captive
of those interests. The natural result was to establish an ad-
ministrative d~marche: an agreement was hammered out be-
tween the Chairmen of the SEC and CFTC (the "Shad-Johnson
Accords"), which allocated jurisdiction between their two agen-
cies.115 Thereafter, Congress enacted the Shad-Johnson Accords
into law.2" In brief, the CFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction
over all commodity futures trading on any instrument, except
that single stock futures were prohibited, joining onions as the
only commodity on which futures trading was banned. 7 The
SEC was given what amounted to a veto over commodity fu-
tures contracts on indexes, 0 and retained jurisdiction over op-
tions trading on the stock exchanges, including options on in-
204. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982); Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot sub.
nom.
205. CFTC and SEC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legislation,
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982).
206. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
207. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
208. See generally Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II, 39 Bus. LAw. 67, 73-74
(1983) (describing scope of Shad-Johnson Accords and veto authority of SEC
on indexes). This veto authority led to another dispute with the CFTC that
was temporarily resolved by another inter-agency agreement. Edward J.
Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition
Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUT. MARKETS 367, 375
(1984). Several years later, the SEC approved options trading on two Dow
Jones indexes and then used its veto power to deny trading of commodity fu-
tures on those same indexes. The Seventh Circuit set that incredible bit of
regulatory chutzpah aside. Board of Trade v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir.
1999).
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dexes."' The SEC and CFTC shared jurisdiction over options
trading on foreign currency."'°
This cooperative allocation of jurisdiction did not mask the
fact that there were two very distinct regulatory cultures at the
CFTC and SEC. The CEA, the predecessor to the CFTC, was
largely driven by economists; the agency had only one lawyer on
staff. The CFTC inherited the CEA's personnel, and most of the
former SEC staff members, who were recruited when the CFTC
was first formed, quickly departed. The economists at the
CFTC, however, were willing to defer to the exchanges and had
an antipathy towards a heavily rule-based regulatory structure.
The occasional activist-lawyer chairman at the CFTC was un-
able to change that culture. As a result, the futures industry
was allowed to develop essentially on its own. 1 In contrast, the
SEC maintained an activist culture driven by lawyers who be-
lieved fervently in regulation. The SEC was quite willing to
direct the development of the market, having lost confidence in
the industry to do so as a result of the paperwork crisis. 12 The
central market concept was apace with that view. ' The SEC
was intrusive in its regulation of the exchanges and broker-
dealers, and was forever seeking to expand its jurisdiction. "
209. The CFTC could not approve options on stock indexes, but it was al-
lowed by the Shad-Johnson Accords to approve options on futures on indexes.
Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
210. The SEC had jurisdiction where options on currency were traded on
the stock exchanges. The CFTC had jurisdiction over options trading on
commodity exchanges and the over-the-counter market. Trading in the over-
the counter market in currency options would plague the CFTC over the next
several years. See 13A MARKHAM, FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS,
supra note 124, § 27:13 (describing cases brought by CFTC against over-the-
counter currency dealers).
211. The CFTC staff did believe strongly that the Commodity Exchange Act
created a monopoly that required futures, and later options, to be traded on a
contract market licensed by the CFTC. See generally Markham, The Com-
modity Exchange Monopoly, supra note 128 (describing CFTC support for the
exchange trading requirement).
212. See supra notes 159, 176-79 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
214. In fairness to the SEC, it was deregulating some important aspects of
the market, i.e., institutional investors, by exempting sales to "accredited
investors" from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.
Compare Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor - Jungle
Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995) (describing regula-
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When given the opportunity, traders often voted with their
feet in assessing the relative efficiency of the commodity futures
and stock exchanges. Stock index futures fit neatly into the
modern portfolio theory of a diversified portfolio."5 Program
trading, dynamic hedging, and index arbitrage offered addi-
tional opportunities for the adroit trader."6 Futures trading on
indexes and interest rate instruments soon outstripped volume
on the more traditional agriculture futures contracts.' Futures
contracts were efficient and presented low costs to traders, who
did not need to buy and sell the stock underlying the index in
order to profit from, or hedge against, fluctuations. This
avoided the transaction costs associated with buying and selling
the underlying securities. 8 Low margins and liquidity also
tory structure for institutional investors and urging even less regulation),
with, Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommen-
dations to Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493 (seeking greater
regulation to protect institutional investors). Integrated disclosure and shelf
registration were also useful in allowing capital raising to be carried out more
efficiently. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and
the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1985) (describing
SEC disclosure system).
215. See generally ROBERT L. HAGIN, THE DOW-JONES IRWIN GUIDE TO
MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY (1979); JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY (2d ed. 1998).
216. See generally Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock
Market Crash of 1987 - The United States Looks at New Recommendations,
76 GEO. L. J. 1993, 1999-2001 (1988) (describing these concepts).
217. Between 1983 and 1994, the volume in financial futures increased from
40% of all futures contracts traded to 83%. By 1994, financial futures ac-
counted for 97% of the trading volume on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
Steven C. Livingston, Rift Grows Between Factions at CBOT, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 26, 1994, at C1.
218. For example, assume that the manager of a portfolio that tracks the
S&P 500 stock index believes that the market will be falling over the next
three months. The manager could sell out the portfolio and buy it back in
when he anticipates recovery. Alternatively, the manager could passively
invest and do nothing, a popular strategy but one that assumes a market re-
covery before the portfolio funds are needed. Alternatively, the manager could
hedge by selling the S&P 500 futures contract. The only cost is commissions,
which can be negotiated to a minimal level. This locks in the value of the
portfolio in the event of a market decline. Of course, the portfolio value is also
locked in if the portfolio manager was wrong. For those interested, and many
were, stock baskets matching the S&P 500 and other indexes could be pur-
chased through the stock markets. This, of course, required payment for the
full value of the stocks in the basket or 50% margin, as compared to the 5% or
less that had to be placed only as security for index futures trading. See gen-
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made stock futures extremely popular with institutional inves-
tors, while interest rate futures were of equal or greater inter-
est to portfolio managers with investments in fixed income se-
curities. The stock markets and futures markets soon became
intermingled and interdependent with this trading. The danger
of this interdependence was brought dramatically home in the
stock market crash of 1987.21
The stock and commodity markets experienced a near melt-
down during the stock market crash that occurred in October
1987. The decline was the largest ever experienced to that date,
exceeding even the 1929 crash.220 Numerous regulatory reports
resulted from that event.2 ' A Presidential commission headed
by later Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady (the "Brady
Commission") concluded that the securities and commodity fu-
tures markets had become intertwined and that a lack of coor-
dinated regulation between the SEC and CFTC was endanger-
ing the markets.2 The Brady Commission recommended a
regulatory restructuring whereby a single agency would be au-
thorized to regulate such matters as margin and credit and in-
formation systems.2
erally SEC DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE ROLE OF INDEX-RELATED
TRADING IN THE MARKET DECLINE ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986 (1987) (de-
scribing use of stock index baskets to facilitate arbitrage trading).
219. Even before the crash, the NYSE was warning of a danger of a "melt-
down" in the stock markets caused by futures trading in indexes. Martin
Mayer, Some Watchdog! How the SEC Helped Set the Stage for Black Monday,
BARRON'S, Dec. 27, 1987, at 18.
220. Comparisons were drawn between the stock market crashes in 1929
and 1987, suggesting the possibility of another depression. Randall Smith,
Market Seers Fret over Analogies to '29-'30, Despite Economic Vigor, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 25. Fortunately, that did not occur. The market also
faced even larger drops in subsequent years. See, e.g., Gloomy Return: U.S.
Stocks Plummet As Trading Resumes Without Major Hitch, WALL ST. J., Sept.
18, 2001, at Al (describing record drop after trading resumed following Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon).
221. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 216, at 2006-21 (describing
these reports).
222. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS,
reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special Report No. 1267 (Jan. 12, 1988)
(report by the Brady Commission).
223. The Brady Commission recommended the Federal Reserve Board as
the agency to serve as a super regulator. Id. at 42.
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The Brady Commission recommendations and the fallout
from the stock market crash of 1987 set off another turf war
between the CFTC and the SEC. Even so, the SEC's report on
the market crash made some startling admissions, including a
concession that the futures markets were popular because they
were more efficient than the securities markets and were even
leading the stock exchanges in setting prices.224 The SEC was
concerned, however, that market volatility had increased sig-
nificantly as a result of futures trading on securities due to low
margins in the futures industry. 5 This reflected another cul-
tural regulatory difference between the SEC and CFTC. Vola-
tility is an accepted, indeed required, part of the futures mar-
kets. Futures are not needed for commodities with stable
prices. Such commodities do not need the benefits of hedging,
and speculators are uninterested because there is no profit to be
made from a stable price.
In contrast, the SEC has a constituency of small investors
that are content with stable prices - they invest in dividend
stocks in such cases - and love for prices to go higher. These
small investors do, however, loathe a drop in prices. When that
happens, the small investors' capital is reduced, which they find
intolerable. Complaints are made to the SEC and to Congress,
demanding protection from such events - a drop i. prices or a
loss on an investment requires a bogeyman; someone must be
punished. The SEC's regulations reflect this bias, as evidenced
by its "tick test" for short sales. ' (There is no such test for long
traders.) In contrast, the CFTC has no tick test; rather, the
commodity futures exchanges use price limits - now called
"circuit breakers" - to halt trading when prices move up or
down in specified amounts. This gives traders an opportunity
224. The tail was indeed wagging the dog. See SEC DIVISION OF MARKET
REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 3-6 (1988) (finding that com-
modity futures exchanges were leading the stock exchanges in pricing).
225. See id. at 3-7 to 3-8 (describing how the futures markets have increased
stock market volatility).
226. Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2002). See generally David C.
Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 1255 (1990).
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to assess market conditions and obtain margin funds." ' There
is no long or short bias in these limits.
The Brady Commission believed that margin requirements
should be harmonized across markets, a recommendation that
the SEC joined.28 They were undercut somewhat by an earlier
Federal Reserve Board study, which had concluded that even
margin requirements on stocks were no longer serving the pur-
poses originally intended by Congress. '29 The SEC again lost the
battle,23' and the only substantive regulation to emerge from the
stock market crash of 1987 was the introduction of circuit
breakers that halted trading when large market moves oc-
curred. Even this regulation was mostly abandoned in later
years because traders did not like these restraints. '
But another game had arrived for the CFTC and SEC to
scrimmage over. Financial engineering had become an accepted
science with the development of numerous new instruments
227. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 216, at 2034-35 (describing
price limits and noting that they were first used by the commodity exchanges
before World War I).
228. See Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 118
(describing SEC and Brady Commission advocacy of higher margins).
229. A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS: A STUDY
BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Dec. 1984) (on
file with author). The Fed later adopted margin requirements based on good
faith loan value for many non-equity securities, which essentially meant that
credit could be extended to the purchaser in amount equal to what the lender
thought the securities were worth to secure the loan. 63 Fed. Reg. 2806,
2811-13 (Jan. 16, 1998). The Fed at one point did express a desire to have
uniform margins for futures and options, but believed the purpose of such
margins should be clearing house protection and not to regulate speculation.
See Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 110, 112, 122
(describing Fed's views on margin).
230. See Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 119-
24 (describing margin fight led by SEC in the Working Group on Financial
Markets created by President Reagan to address the concerns raised by the
Brady Commission report). In a bit of silliness, Congress did grant the power
to set margins on stock indexes to the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590, 3629 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). The Fed ceded that authority to the CFTC, which in turn relin-
quished it to the commodity exchanges - precisely where the authority had
started. See Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule, supra note 167, at 1093
n. 12 (describing delegation of this authority).
231. See Andrew Hill & John Labate, Assault on American Finance, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 2001, at 5 (describing history of circuit breakers and
their widening).
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having characteristics of both futures and options. 32 The swap
contract was one such product; its popularity was almost in-
stantaneous and it soon became a substantive part of corporate
finance.233 The CFTC awakened only slowly to this threat, but
eventually responded by seeking to curb the growth of over-the-
counter commodity-related instruments. It adopted regula-
tions that created an inscrutable formula for determining
whether particular instruments would be required to trade only
on a commodity exchange. 35 This effort proved to be less than
successful, and the CFTC was left to struggle with a growing
list of derivative instruments that were being introduced in the
market.
In the early 1990s significant losses were encountered by a
number of large institutions - Gibson Greeting and Procter &
Gamble suffered tremendously; Orange County in California
and the Barings Bank went bankrupt, to name just a few. 36
These losses touched off another round of handwringing at the
SEC and more studies.2 Still, nothing was done, except that
the SEC brought a case claiming that certain of these instru-
ments were securities, and the CFTC brought another case
claiming that other instruments were futures that had to be
232. The Seventh Circuit held that the SEC had improperly approved the
trading of so-called "index participation" contracts ("IPs") on the CBOE and
that these contracts fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied
sub nom., Investment Company Institute v. SEC, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).
233. See generally Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk:
Innovative Finance or the Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023 (1994)
(describing swaps).
234. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments
Under the Commodity Exchange Act - Alternatives Are Needed, 1990 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the development of over-the-counter deriva-
tives).
235. Under these rules, unless otherwise regulated, if the instrument's
commodity futures or options element outweighed its securities characteris-
tics, it had to be traded on a commodity futures exchange. Regulation of Hy-
brid Instruments, 17 C.F.R. §§ 34.1-34.3 (2002).
236. See Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 28-
31 (1994) (cataloguing losses).
237. Id. at 32-40 (describing the reports).
238. In re BT Securities, 52 S.E.C. 109, 113-15 (1994) (consent order).
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traded on a contract market. ' A furor ensued, and both agen-
cies' rulings were undercut by court decisions. 4' The SEC then
proceeded to create a safe harbor from onerous regulation
through so-called "Broker-Dealer Lite" registration.4 ' The CFTC
viewed this as a threat to its jurisdiction and announced a plan
to conduct an investigation of over-the-counter derivatives to
determine whether they should be regulated, though the indus-
try viewed this as no more than a cover to lay the groundwork
for such regulation. The SEC, the Treasury Department, and
the Federal Reserve Board all weighed in against such a juris-
dictional grab. In the end, Congress responded with legislation
that stopped the CFTC.24' Yet all of this commotion was for
naught - as of the beginning of 2000, only one firm had regis-
tered as a Broker-Dealer Lite. '43
239. In re BT Securities, CFTC Doc. No. 95-3, at 95-4 (C.F.T.C. 1994) (con-
sent order). See also In re M.G. Refining & Marketing, Inc., CFTC Doc. No.
95-14 (C.F.T.C. 1995) (illegal over-the-counter trading in a futures product).
240. Thereafter, the SEC exempted dealers from registration as broker-
dealers if they engaged in such activities. To the extent government securities
were involved, they were exempt securities. 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra
note 35, § 14.9. A district court also held that contracts similar to those
claimed to be securities by the SEC were not such. Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1996). But see Caiola
v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (disagreeing with analysis of the
court in Procter & Gamble).
The CFTC had to back off its expansive ruling. C.F.T.C. Says Ruling
Didn't Expand Scope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at D4. See also In re MG
Ref. & Mktg. Litig., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,956 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(CFTC consent decree was not binding as collateral estoppel). See generally
Alton B. Harris, The CFTC and Derivative Products; Purposeful Ambiguity
and Jurisdictional Reach, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117 (1996) (describing the
CFTC and SEC cases against BT Securities).
241. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-13 (2002). Broker-Dealer Lite is a regulatory struc-
ture created by the SEC in 1998. It gives securities firms the option to estab-
lish OTC dealer affiliates ("OTC Derivatives Dealers") that operate under
lower net capital requirements and less stringent margin rules than are ap-
plicable to other broker-dealers. See generally OTC Derivatives Dealers, Re-
lease No. 34-40,594, 63 Fed. Reg. 59, 362 (Nov. 3, 1998).
242. See 23 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 2.09 (describing this regu-
latory dust-up).
243. Id. § 2.10.
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V. MARKET STRUCTURE CHANGES
The financial services sectors were undergoing sweeping
changes while the SEC and CFTC competed with each other in
their regulatory programs. Banks were increasing their pene-
tration of the securities industry through "Section 20" subsidi-
aries that could engage in limited dealing in securities.4 ' The
bank regulators continued to drop barriers to bank entry into
the commodity futures and options business,'45 and insurance
became a popular bank product." Finally, the GLBA freed the
banks of most of the remaining Glass-Steagall restrictions on
their financial services activities. 7
In the meantime, the world of derivatives and securities trad-
ing had changed. Over-the-counter instruments, such as swaps,
caps, collars and floors, were an increasingly popular alterna-
tive to exchange-traded commodity futures and options. Com-
petition from abroad was also posing a major threat to the
dominance of the American futures and options markets. The
commodity exchanges in America had long ruled the futures
markets, but the largest futures exchange in the world at the
end of the twentieth century was Eurex, a German exchange.
244. Banks were allowed to acquire discount brokers. See Sec. Indus. Ass'n
v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984). The Fed also al-
lowed bank subsidiaries to engage up to 5% of their business in otherwise
ineligible securities under the Glass-Steagall Act. See Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1059 (1989). The limitation was subsequently increased first to 10%, and
later to 25%, which was sufficient to allow banks to own large full service
broker-dealers. Revenue Limit on Bank-ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of
Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities,
61 Fed. Reg. 68,750, 68, 751 (Dec. 30, 1996).
245. The leading derivatives dealers in 1993 were mostly banks. Markham,
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 4, at 259.
246. Broome & Markham, supra note 19, at 763-64.
247. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
248. Adding to the embarrassment from this loss of position was the fact
that Germany had barred futures trading until the end of the 1980s. William
P. Rogers & Jerry W. Markham, The Application of West German Statutes to
United States Commodity Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Poli-
cies, 19 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1987). Volume is still high on American
exchanges, but Eurex is the leader. Christopher Bowe, Survey - World Stock
and Derivative Exchanges, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6, 2002, at 4. Commod-
ity exchanges in the U.S. were conducting only 40% of futures trading world-
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How did this come to pass? Foreign exchanges had undercut
the American markets mostly through electronic trading. The
monopoly given to the contract markets by the Commodity Ex-
change Act of 1936 had created an industry tied to the trading
floors. The floor members controlled the exchanges and were
loathe to give up the time and place advantage on the floor to
an electronic forum where everyone has equal access. 49 Mem-
bers' capital was at risk, so they would cling to this franchise as
long as possible. 59 Market share gradually slipped away to the
over-the-counter derivative markets and to the electronic ex-
changes abroad. Like the American car manufacturers in the
1970s, the exchanges and their members saw their volume be-
ing eroded by more nimble competitors, but refused to compete,
preferring shelter in their dwindling market share to the risks
of competition.
The commodity exchanges in America were unable to push
through regulations that would stop the over-the-counter trad-
ing. Swaps and other such derivatives had slipped past the lob-
byists for the exchanges and were now too big to stop. Fur-
thermore, the CFTC was cut off from regulating over-the-
counter derivatives by Congress after the Broker-Dealer Lite
fiasco. The exchanges then decided to seek entry to over-the-
counter trading.51 The CFTC adopted rules to deregulate over-
the-counter derivatives.52 This proposal was enacted into law
by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
wide in 1997, down from 78% in 1988. Fred Vogelstein, Futures Marts in the
U.S. Run Scared, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at C1.
249. See generally Bowe, supra note 248, at 4 (describing how the Chicago
Board of Trade clings to its open outcry trading system and falls from first to
third place in exchange trading volume).
250. See generally Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly, supra
note 128, at 1014-15 (describing franchise concerns of floor members). Demu-
tualization, however, offers a way for the exchange members to recapture
their capital investment and seek to become more competitive. See generally
Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as
Usual?, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Demutuali-
zation].
251. See John M. Broder, Wide Open Once Again? Chicago Exchanges Seek
to Loosen Yoke of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at D1.
252. See A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, Intermediar-
ies and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 42,256 (Aug. 10, 2001).
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("CFMA").1 3 Among other things, the legislation, through what
in part is sometimes called the "Enron amendment," exempted
most over-the-counter derivatives from regulation as long as the
parties were large institutions or wealthy individuals. 4 The
commodity exchanges were allowed to keep their contract mar-
ket monopoly over markets in which small traders were allowed
to participate. The CFMA also allowed trading in single stock
futures under a strange formula in which the CFTC and SEC
shared jurisdiction.25 Commodity markets conducting trading
in single stock futures were required to adopt rules equivalent
to those in the securities industry, including insider trading
prohibitions. 6 Margin requirements also had to match those in
the securities industry. The level for stock margins was there-
fore applied, a level several magnitudes greater than for futures
trading.5 7 This was one of the few instances where Congress
253. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
254. The amendment received this informal reference as a result of the fact
that the Enron Corporation, a large trader in over-the-counter energy deriva-
tives, was its principal sponsor before the company went bankrupt.
255. The Shad-Johnson Accords had prohibited such single stock futures.
See note 206 and accompanying text. For the CFTC's notice rules for securi-
ties exchanges to become designated contract markets in securities products,
see Designated Contract Markets in Security Futures Products: Notice-
Designation Requirements, Continuing Obligations, Applications for Exemp-
tive Orders, and Exempt Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,960 (Aug. 27, 2001).
256. The National Futures Association ("NFA") was required to conform its
customer protection rules to those of the SEC, thereby introducing insider
trading prohibitions into the futures markets. See Self Regulatory Organiza-
tion; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change
by National Futures Association Relating to Security Futures Products, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-44,823, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,439 (Sept. 27, 2001) (NFA
conforming its rules). Customers trading on the futures markets will not re-
ceive SIPC insurance, but customers trading such instruments on securities
markets will be insured. Applicability of CFTC and SEC Customer Protec-
tion, Record Keeping, Reporting and Bankruptcy Rules, Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 28,641 (C.F.T.C. & S.E.C. 2001).
257. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 ("CFMA") amended
Section 7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide the Federal
Reserve Board with authority to set margin requirement, for futures on indi-
vidual securities and narrow based indexes. The Federal Reserve Board dele-
gated this rule- making authority jointly to the CFTC and the SEC. Customer
Margin Rules Relating to Securities Futures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
44,853, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Sept. 26, 2001). The CFMA required margin for
single stock futures to be no lower than the lowest level of margin required for
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rejected competitive regulation and mandated that the CFTC
adopt SEC requirements.
Although the SEC won this regulatory encomium from Con-
gress, it was facing other challenges. The securities markets
were trending up during most of the 1990s, volume was increas-
ing, and more investors were being drawn into the markets.
Despite all of these positive aspects, the securities markets, like
the futures markets, faced many challenges due to new com-
puter technology. The computer allowed the creation of "SOES
Bandits,"5 and these traders soon became "day traders." The
computer thus allowed even small traders to trade like profes-
sionals, creating a new set of regulatory problems for the SEC.59
comparable options contract traded on national securities exchanges. Rules
proposed by the CFTC and SEC established a minimal initial and mainte-
nance margin level of 20% of the current market value of the position. This
20% level is far in excess of the normal margin requirements for futures con-
tracts in the commodity futures industry, where margins are often less than
5% of the value of the contract. Customer Margin Rules Relating to Securities
Futures; Applicability of CFTC and SEC Customer Protection, Recordkeeping,
Reporting, and Bankruptcy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44,996, 76
S.E.C. Docket 383 (Oct. 29, 2001); Customer Margin Rules Relating to Securi-
ties Futures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44,853, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Sept.
26, 2001).
258. SOES Bandits is a reference to traders who used the automated
Nasdaq Small Order Execution System ("SOES") to pick off market maker
quotes before they could be changed where an event with market effect occurs.
The Nasdaq market makers were subject to stiff withdrawal restrictions after
they exited the market en masse during the stock market crash of 1987. See
Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing SOES Bandits). To
avoid the SOES Bandits, the Nasdaq market makers engaged in several collu-
sive practices that became the subject of an SEC investigation and caused the
reorganization of the NASD. See In re Certain Market Making Activities on
NASDAQ, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,900, 68 S.E.C. 2693 (Jan. 11, 1998)
(order describing these collusive practices).
259. See generally Caroline Bradley, Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and
the Ideology of "Fair and Orderly Markets," 26 J. CORP. L. 63 (2000) (describ-
ing problems caused by, and regulation of, day traders). The day trader en-
tered orders through computerized systems operated by discount brokers at
low commission rates. The system allowed day traders to "scalp" by quick in-
and-out trades that sought short term profits. However, most day traders in
fact lost money. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42,
at 333-34 (survey finds that 90% of day traders lost money). These traders
raised the concern that their trading was adding volatility to the market. See
Edward Watt & David Barboza, Internet Stocks Falter, Causing Wider Wor-
ries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1999, at Al. Day traders were often avoiding or
evading margin requirements by having their broker-dealer arrange loans
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In addition, the Internet permitted small investors to trade
online."6 This medium was also used to evade the gatekeeper
status of analysts, so that "pump and dump" schemes became
common.
2 61
More threatening to the status quo in the securities industry
were the electronic communication networks ("ECNs"), which
were no more than order matching services that had no market
makers.62  ECNs were popular with institutions because they
removed intermediaries, such as the exchange specialist, from
among customers and by closing out positions before the end of the trading
day. See generally Ruth Simon, Day-Trading Firms' Moves that Skirt Margin-
Lending Rules are Being Probed, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1999, at Cl. The
NYSE and NASD imposed special margin restrictions on day traders to curb
these practices. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Margin
Requirements for Day Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44,009, 74
S.E.C. Docket 1000 (Feb. 27, 2001). For more on day trading margin require-
ments, see id. Short sale tick test restrictions were also being avoided by
these traders. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42,
at 333. The SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC (still another layer of regulation)
conducted a coordinated sweep operation that resulted in fourteen firms being
charged with fraud in promoting their day trading programs. Ronald Taylor,
14 Firms Snagged in Coordinated Move as Day Trading Promoters Cited for
Fraud, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 586 (May 8, 2000). There were also some
tragedies. Mark (the "Rocket"), a failed day trader, attacked his brokerage
firm and killed twelve people. Another failed day trader threw his wife off a
balcony in order to obtain the proceeds from her life insurance policy. 3
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 334.
260. Online trading was a boon for the discount brokers and posed a threat
to the large full service brokers. Charles Schwab, the largest online broker,
saw its stock capitalization value exceed that of Merrill Lynch (but dropping
to less than half of that of Merrill Lynch after the market downturn that be-
gan in 2000). Merrill Lynch resisted the introduction of online trading, but
was finally forced by competition to offer this product. See 3 MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 295-97, 353.
261. HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 14.18, at 292 (describing pump and
dump schemes). These operations involved such colorful characters as Tokyo
Joe's S.A. and various students, causing the SEC to set up an Office of Inter-
net Enforcement and a "cyberforce" to which 200 lawyers were assigned. 3
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 293, 344-45.
262. Instinet was the pioneer in this field. See Rebecca Buckman, Plan by
Chicago Exchanges to Offer Extended Trading is Sign of the Times, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 23, 1999, at Cll. Island ECN has also been a popular electronic trad-
ing platform. It was seeking to become an exchange. Greg Ip, Trading Places:
The Stock Exchanges, Long Static, Suddenly are Roiled by Change, WALL ST.
J., July 27, 1999, at Al.
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the transaction, thereby saving costs."3 The SEC ruled initially
that ECNs were not exchanges because they did not make a
continuous market in securities,2 ' thus freeing the ECNs from
the onerous regulation imposed by the SEC on the exchanges.
The popularity of ECNs distressed Nasdaq and the stock ex-
changes, since they were losing large amounts of volume to
those operations .2 5 The large brokerage firms heightened the
exchanges' fear with a proposal for a centralized electronic trad-
ing system with a central limit order book ("CLOB"). Defend-
ers of the exchanges claimed that the ECNs were becoming a
cover for the large broker-dealers to internalize their order flow
upstairs and away from the exchanges. Critics claimed that
CLOB would fragment the market, making it less transparent
and, therefore, less efficient.6 ' The SEC was sympathetic to the
exchanges and raised its long-dead central market concept to
suggest an alternative centralization of electronic trading that
would prevent fragmentation and preclude the internalization
of order flows by broker-dealers." It might seem odd to think of
the government defending cartels like the stock exchanges from
263. See generally Greg Ip et al., Market Structure Debate Embroils Street,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at C19 (describing growth of ECNs).
264. See, eg., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Delta Government Options
Corp.; Order Granting Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 19, 1990) (describ-
ing "exchange" as one that maintains a continuous market); Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Delta Government Options Corp.; Order Granting Temporary
Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,611, 55
Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 12, 1990) (same). Nasdaq could itself be defined as an
ECN except that it makes a continuous market in securities.
265. Nasdaq is retaining only 28% of the volume in the stocks it trades.
ECNs were accounting for 42.5% of the volume in Nasdaq stocks in the second
quarter of 2002. Jeremy Adams, Nasdaq Losing Ground to ECNs,
EFINANcIALNEWS, Aug. 5, 2002, available at LEXIS, Financial News Group.
For a description of the proliferation of ECNs, see 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN,
supra note 35, § 13.02.
266. Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, Sweeping Change in Market
Structure Sought, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at C1.
267. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wall Street Fuddy Duddies CLOBber the Fu-
ture, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2000, at A23. See also Matthew Andersen, Don't
CLOBber ECN's, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2000, at A48 (discussing effect of a
CLOB requirement on ECNs).
268. Gretchen Morgenson, SEC Chief Wants One Site for Posting All Stock
Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al.
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competition.69 In the end, the SEC retreated from its proposal,
but eventually adopted a regulation designed to make the ECNs
more transparent.2"'
Like the commodity exchanges, the stock markets were an
endangered species. 1 Despite the regulatory competition be-
tween the CFTC and SEC, both markets had been undercut by
their clinging to the franchises given to them under, respec-
tively, the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 and the Securities
269. See Randall Smith, Will NYSE Get Bowled Over by Rivals?, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 19, 2000, at C1.
270. Regulation ATS (Alternate Trading Systems), 17 C.F.R. § 242.300
(2002).
271. Although the ECNs have not aggressively targeted the NYSE, that
exchange had lost a large amount of market share to Nasdaq. The Chicago
Stock Exchange was attacking both the NYSE and Nasdaq by trading through
the Internet. It became the second largest stock exchange in the U.S., ousting
Amex, which is owned by Nasdaq, from that position. Joel Seligman, Rethink-
ing Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on Market Information
and the Future of the National Market System, 57 Bus. LAw. 637, 672 n.148
(2002). The ECNs have focused on Nasdaq stocks. John Labate, High - Tech
Systems Jolt Old Markets into Action, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6, 2002, at 4.
Nasdaq responded to this threat by creating its own electronic trading plat-
form - SuperMontage. Kate Kelly, SEC Clears New Nasdaq Trading Plat-
form, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at C1. Nasdaq also sought to mimic the
European exchanges by demutualizing and selling its own stock to raise capi-
tal. Susan Harrigan, Nasdaq Trading in Old System, NEWSDAY, July 10,
2002, at A41. See also Bradley, supra note 250 (discussing demutualization
plans of stock and commodity exchanges around the world and implications of
that phenomenon). Nasdaq was also seeking linkages with foreign exchanges.
Terzah Ewing, NASD Presents Details of its Plan for Nasdaq Europe, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at C12. It did not have much success with that effort.
David Ibson & Mariko Sanchanta, Nasdaq Japan Faces Up to Uncertain Fu-
ture, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 2002, at 29 (describing how the Nasdaq
plan to globally link America, Japan, and Germany ran into difficulty in Ja-
pan, and Nasdaq decided to withdraw from that market). See also generally
Phred Dvorak & Craig Karmin, Saga of Series of Poor Moves, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 2002, at C1 (describing reasons for failure); Isabelle Clary, Nasdaq
Turns to Germany in Bid to Expand Globally, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, June 24,
2002, available at 2002 WL 8195226 (Nasdaq seeks new alliances in Europe to
expand its trading).
The commodity exchanges were having similar problems. A linkage
between Eurex and the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") fell apart in 2002,
but the CBOT announced it would be trading electronically side-by-side with
its trading floor. David Greising, On Bickering Street, Sounds of Conciliation,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 2002, at B1. The CBOT was also seeking to demu-
tualize. Jeremy Grant, CBOT Near Demutualization, FIN. TIMES (London),
Aug. 12, 2002, at 15.
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Exchange Act of 1934. Both commodity and stock exchanges
were undermined by trading in non-conventional (and less regu-
lated) markets. The over-the-counter derivatives threatened
the commodity exchanges, and the ECNs were wreaking similar
havoc in the stock markets.
VI. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY OF THE U.K.
The regulatory structure for financial services in the U.K. has
its own history. The Bank of England, which was founded in
1694 as a private institution, provided much of that regulation
until the latter part of the twentieth century.72 Its regulatory
role was, however, executed principally through "raised eye-
brows," a form of regulation lent force by the knowledge that
disapproval by the Bank of England could exclude a firm from
the financial markets.2" The Bank was also the U.K.'s central
bank and lender of last resort.74 A more formal bank regulatory
system was introduced in the Banking Act 1979, 27 which was in
turn replaced by a strengthened Banking Act 1987.276
272. The Bank of England was nationalized in 1946, but given operational
independence in 1997. Bank of England, About the Bank: Did You Know...
Historical Trivia, at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/didyouknow.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003).
273. See Jane Martinson, Nine Finance Watchdogs Must Squeeze Into One
Skin, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1997, at 9 (referencing "raised eyebrow"
approach to regulation by the Bank of England).
274. George Peabody & Co. was saved by a loan of £800,000 during the
Panic of 1857. His firm would evolve into J.P. Morgan & Co., now JP Morgan
Chase. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900), at 357
(2002) [hereinafter 1 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.]. The Bank
of England would also rescue the Barings banking firm in 1890 during the
Baring Panic of that year. Id. at 308. The Bank of England declined a further
rescue of the Barings bank in 1995, after the firm lost over $1 billion from the
unauthorized futures trading of a twenty-eight year old employee, Nicholas
Leeson. JUDITH H. RAWNSLEY, TOTAL RISK: NICK LEESON AND THE FALL OF
BARINGS BANK (1995).
275. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and
Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States,
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 629-35 (1999) (describing bank regulation in the U.K
and the background of the Banking Act 1979 and its revision by the Banking
Act 1987).
276. Philip N. Hablutzel, A Legal Sampler: British Banks' Role in U.K.
Capital Markets Since the Big Bang, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 365, 373 (1992).
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Lloyd's of London, a financial club that self-regulated the
City's insurance industry, was shaken by scandals in the 1970s.
An investigation was conducted by Sir Henry Fisher at the be-
hest of the government and a new reform law was enacted in
1982.77 This legislation, however, carried forward Lloyd's self-
regulation, and did not prevent further scandals or the losses
that came from a series of disasters in the 1980s.27 ' The securi-
ties and commodity markets in the U.K. also operated in a club-
like fashion for much of their history.79 Though the London
Stock Exchange was the primary regulator of morals, the Bank
of England and government agencies played a loose role during
times of crisis. A Prevention of Fraud Act was adopted in 1958,
but it did little to impose affirmative regulation.8 ' This regula-
tory approach was questioned after a series of scandals that
began in the 1970s in the securities markets.2"' A collapse of the
tin market in 1985 raised additional concerns with regulation.
The fiasco cost members of the London Metals Exchange £600
million, as well as threatened the exchange's existence. 82
In the midst of these events, Professor Jim Gower prepared a
white paper for the Department of Trade and Industry8 . on
steps needed for investor protection.2 8  This led to corrective
legislation in the form of the Financial Services Act, which im-
plemented what became known as the "Big Bang" in 1986. The
legislation drew heavily from the SEC regulatory model in the
277. Lloyd's Act, 1982, c. 14 (Eng.).
278. Ian Kelley, Note, Regulatory Crisis at Lloyd's of London: Reform from
Within, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1924, 1924-25 (1995).
279. For an extensive description of the London financial markets, see 1-4
DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON (1994).
280. Richard Northedge, Scandals Led to New Legislation for London Fi-
nancial District, SUNDAY Bus. (London), Nov. 20, 2001.
281. Henry Laurence, The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 647, 660-61 (1999).
282. Kenneth Gooding, Metals Business Booms, FIN. TIMES (London), May 5,
1994, at 14.
283. This ministry was the successor to the Board of Trade that regulated
the colonies and corporations that owned America before their charters were
revoked by the Crown. 1 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra
note 274, at 29-35 (2001).
284. LAURENCE CECIL BARTLETT GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION
(1985).
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U.S., and, among other things, eliminated fixed commissions."'
Furthermore, the separation of "stock jobbers," (i.e., dealers and
brokers), was removed in favor of competing market makers. 8'
The Big Bang legislation also created a Securities and In-
vestment Board ("SIB") that reported to the Department of
Trade and Industry. This was a variation on the SEC model -
the members of SIB included government officials as well as
private individuals, and the SIB had no enforcement powers.8 7
Financial firms were required to register with an SRO or with
the SIB. The SROs were in turn required to regulate the con-
duct of their members and could impose fines, censures, and
bans. 8' One of the more important of the SROs was the Securi-
ties and Futures Authority, 9 which combined the regulation of
futures and securities, an approach not followed in the U.S.
Although this concept appears to be a mixture of the Municipal
Securities Rule Making Board ("MSRB") and the SEC in the
U.S., 98 the SIB was actually a compromise designed to preserve
the culture of the City of London's club-like regulation.
285. Fixed commissions had been eliminated in the U.S. on "May Day" in
1975 as the result of an SEC mandate. H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 46 (1975).
286. See Patrick M. Creaven, Note, Inside Outside Leave Me Alone: Domestic
and EC-Motivated Reform in the UK Securities Industry, 60 FORDHAM L. REv.
S285, S287-89 (1992) (describing Big Bang legislation). See generally Norman
S. Poser, Big Bang and the Financial Services Act Seen Through American
Eyes, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 317, 318 (1988) (describing Big Bang); NORMAN S.
POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S "BIG BANG" AND THE
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 27-31 (1991).
287. Laurence, supra note 281, at 662.
288. Member firms were required to second employees in order to provide a
staff for the SROs. Id. at 662.
289. Helen Nugent, Taking Grief Out of Grievances, INDEP. (London) Sept.
20, 1998, at 20.
290. The MSRB is a self-regulatory body composed of members representing
securities firms, bank representatives, and the public. It is a hybrid body that
was given the responsibility of enacting rules for the registration and regula-
tion of bank and non-bank municipal securities dealers. Its authority is lim-
ited to proposing and adopting rules to regulate transactions in municipal
securities. Those rules must be approved by the SEC before they are effec-
tive. Enforcement of MSRB rules is left to the SEC, the NASD, and the bank
regulatory agencies. HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 10.5, at 539-45.
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The SIB proved to be a reluctant and ineffective regulator,
and another series of scandals led to calls for further reform.291
The scandals included the "Blue Arrow" rights affair, Robert
Maxwell's defalcations, the BCCI debacle, and several insider
trading cases.92 The crisis at Barings plc., 193 then precipitated
more legislation, which created the FSA-UK in 1997.2' The
FSA-UK is an "independent non-governmental body which ex-
ercises statutory powers. ... " The agency was to assume the
duties of nine regulatory entities, 2  abandoning the clubby use
of SROs. 2 17 In 1998 the FSA-UK was even given the authority to
291. Richard Northedge, Scandals Led to New Legislation for London Fi-
nancial District, SUNDAY Bus. (London), Nov. 20, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File.
292. See generally TOM BOWER, MAXWELL THE OUTSIDER (1992); PETER
TRUELL & LARRY GURWIN, FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI, THE
WORLD'S MOST CORRUPT FINANCIAL EMPIRE (1992); Betty M. Ho, Rethinking
the System of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of Hong Kong, 42
MCGILL L.J. 603, 629 (1997) (describing the "Blue Arrow" affair); Barry A.K.
Rider, The Control of Insider Trading - Smoke And Mirrors, 19 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2000) (discussing lack of enforcement against insider trading).
Pensioners had also been the subject of sales schemes in which, under
a new law designed to encourage the privatizing of pensions, they were "mis-
sold" on the drawbacks of investing on their own rather than in a public or
company pension scheme. Simon Robinson, Follow the Money, TIME (Int'l ed.),
July 27, 1998, at 36. See generally Richard Nobles & Julia Black, The Privati-
zation Process: Pensions Mis-Selling - The Lessons for Regulating Privatized
Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 933 (1998); Steve Stecklow & Sara Calian,
Financial Flop: Social Security Switch in U.K is Disastrous; A Caution to the
U.S.?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at Al.
293. See supra note 274.
294. Thomas Sims, Single Regulators Are Catching on in Europe, WALL ST.
J. (International), Mar. 6, 2001, at A14.
295. FSA, INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 4 (2001)
[hereinafter INTRO. TO THE FSA]. The agency is funded by the industry and is
accountable to Treasury Ministers. Id.
296. See FSA, Further Integration of Financial Regulatory Services at the
FSA, (Feb. 2, 2001), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/press/2001/017.html (list-
ing the integrated regulators); Nine into One Does Go, REINSURANCE MAO.,
June 8, 1998, at 28, available at http://www.insurancewindow.net/story.asp?l
sectioncode=00&arch=true&storycode=14043 (same).
297. There were to be no industry representatives on the FSA-UK. Helen
Liddell Interview: New Tricks for Old Watchdogs, INVESTORS CHRONICLE, Oct.
31, 1997, at 21.
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oversee the banks, taking that power away from the Bank of
England."8
The FSA-UK became a monolithic super regulator that was
firmly in the hands of the government, and was to be "the single
governing entity of the entire financial services spectrum, from
securities and futures trading to funeral planning. ""2  The
agency was given responsibility to regulate virtually every as-
pect of finance, assuming the same roles played in the U.S. by
the SEC, the CFTC, federal bank regulators, and state banking,
insurance and securities commissions, as well as the SROs.3 1 It
was also provided with expanded enforcement powers that in-
cluded the right to bring actions against violators and impose
sanctions. 3 ' The FSA-UK, however, started with only 2,000
employees for the regulation of 10,000 companies."2 Even so,
immediate concern was raised that the new agency would be-
come bureaucratic and intrusive and seek to implement a rule-
based regulatory system like the one in the U.S.
0 3
The FSA-UK took several steps to unify regulation. First, a
single ombudsman was to be created by the agency to handle
298. Andr6 Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initia-
tives in the U.S. and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 198 (2000).
The Bank of England retained the right to set interest rates under the Bank
of England Act 1998. See Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, § 7, sched. 2; Bank
of England, About the Bank: Core Purposes, at http://www.bankofengland.co.
uk/corepurposes.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
299. The Risk Business, LAWYER, Sept. 10, 2001, at 21.
300. Silvia Ascarelli, Britain's Fiscal Watchdog to Bite as Well as Bark,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2001, at A13.
301. The Seamless Web of Financial Regulation, COMPLIANCE MONITOR, Oct.
2001, at 1.
302. Ascarelli, supra note 300. The agency also admitted that many of these
employees were inexperienced in regulation. Suzy Jagger, Death of Capital-
ism, THE MIRROR (London), June 29, 2002, at 14. See also Jeffrey L. Hiday,
Hot Properties: U.K. Regulators Vie for Compliance Staffers in Tight Market,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at A17 (expressing concern with whether the agency
would be able to keep even these employees). The 1999 budget for the FSA-
UK was £154 million. George Graham, Banking Watchdog Budgets for Re-
duced Costs, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 1998, at 11. In the U.S., the SEC's
budget alone was twice that amount and has recently been increased to $ 776
million. Alec Klein & Dan Eggen, U.S. Opens Criminal AOL Probe: Justice
Dept. to Focus on Unusual Accounting, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at AO1.
303. Silvia Ascarelli, Deals & Deal Makers: New U.K. Financial Regulator
Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2001, at C16.
378 [Vol. 28:2
20031 FINANCIAL REG. IN U.S., U.K., & JAPAN
complaints by customers in all sectors of public finance, 3 as
opposed to the various hotlines for federal and state agencies in
the U.S., the numerous arbitration tribunals of the SROs, and
the singular reparations procedure at the CFTC in the U.S.
The FSA-UK further replaced the six separate insurance funds
with a single Financial Services Compensation Scheme
("FSCS"), which provided customers with compensation in the
event of the insolvency of a financial service firm.35  This
sharply contrasts with the U.S. system that spreads responsi-
bility among the FDIC, the Bank Insurance Fund, the Savings
Association Insurance Fund, the SIPA Corporation ("SIPC"),
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the funds cre-
ated by states for insurance companies.
The FSA-UK is also seeking publication of comparative in-
formation disclosures for a range of financial instruments that
would allow more informed investment decisions.3" The FSA-
UK assigned one office to develop policy on prudential issues
across all financial sectors, so as to develop a common approach
to risk and capital requirements. 7 There has been no compa-
rable effort in the U.S., where there are separate capital re-
quirements for insurance companies, banks, broker-dealers, and
futures commission merchants. As a lawyer for the FSA-UK
notes: "[olur advantage is that we can look at the market as a
whole .... We can see what's falling between the cracks.""
The agency also announced that it was streamlining the exist-
304. Nugent, supra note 289. The FSA-UK appoints the board of this Fi-
nancial Ombudsman Service ("FOS") and promulgates its rules, but the FOS
is operationally independent of the FSA-UK. See INTRO. TO THE FSA, supra
note 295, at 18.
305. Id. The FSA-UK appoints the board of the FSCS and promulgates its
rules, but the FSCS is operationally independent of the FSA-UK. See id.
306. Howard Davies, The Coming of the Single Financial Regulator, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 16, 2001, at 2.
307. Andrea Felsted, Financial Consolidation Held Back by Inconsistent
Regulation, FIN. TIMES (London), July, 13, 2000, at 2; Equitable Life: FSA
Response to Baird Report, Oct. 17, 2001, HERMES Database. This was a
change from the previous sector-by-sector analysis used before the creation of
the FSA-UK by the various regulatory bodies in London. Outcome of Consul-
tation on Prudential Regulation Endorses "Single" Regulator, May 10, 2000,
HERMES Database.
308. The Risk Business, LAWYER, Sept. 10, 2001, at 21.
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ing fourteen rulebooks for financial services into one. 9 The
FSA-UK has been focusing its regulatory attention on high-risk
firms, while requiring other firms to report and to comply with
conduct standards set out in its rulebook.1 By contrast, the
FSA-UK specified several governing principles involving man-
agement responsibility and internal control systems, as well as
financial requirements." The agency, like the SEC, placed
heavy emphasis on supervisory responsibilities of managers."'
Of course, the FSA-UK did not stop financial problems in the
U.K., and, in fact, it encountered criticism for its handling of
the Equitable Life closure.3"' Thereafter, the agency became
more aggressive in the regulation of the insurance sector, but
still depended on company managers to prevent wrongdoing314
The FSA-UK also began a program of enforcement actions, im-
posing fines and banning wrongdoers from trading in London."5
Like markets in the U.S., the London markets were affected
by the new competition. The London International Financial
Futures and Options Exchange ("LIFFE") had become the sec-
309. The agency stated that its single rulebook would still differentiate for
different types of businesses and customers. FSA Plan & Budget for
1999/2000, Feb. 3, 1999, HERMES Database. As an interim measure, the old
rulebooks were incorporated into a single sourcebook. George Walker, Regu-
latory Review 2001, FIN. REG. INT'L (London), Feb. 2002, available at LEXIS,
England & Wales, Journals.
310. Davies, supra note 306.
311. Walker, supra note 309.
312. Maeve Bromwich, The Watchdog Needs a Firm Hand, LAWYER, Dec. 2,
1997, at 13.
313. James Mackintosh, Regulator Faces Rising Tide of Trouble, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 20, 2001, at 16.
314. Change Ongoing as FSA Gets to Grips with Its UK Financial Markets
Role, INS. DAY, June 26, 2002.
315. One enforcement action involved the manipulation of stock prices on
the Swedish Stock Exchange by the "Flaming Ferraris," a group of traders
working at Credit Suisse First Boston in London. James Archer, the son of
Lord Archer (who was himself in prison for perjury), was a member of this
group, which was named after their favorite cocktail. James Archer was
banned for life from working in the City by the FSA-UK. Sanctions were also
imposed on other members of the group. James Mackintosh, James Archer
Banned from City Trading for Shares Deception, FIN. TIMES (London), July 28,
2001, at 3. Another enforcement case resulted in a $500,000 fine imposed on
PaineWebber International for failing to have adequate anti-money launder-
ing procedures in place. Ernest Beck, PaineWebber Receives Fine by U.K
Agency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2001, at C18.
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ond largest commodity exchange in the world, behind the Chi-
cago Board of Trade."' Nevertheless, market share was fleeing
rapidly to the electronic trading systems on Eurex in Germany.
In 1998 LIFFE closed its trading floor, abandoning its open out-
cry system in favor of electronic trading."7 But it was too late
for LIFFE to regain its position, and the exchange was later
acquired by Euronext, the continental exchange that had al-
ready combined exchanges in Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, and
Lisbon.1 8
The London Stock Exchange ("LSE"), Europe's largest, was
also dealing with this new competition. 9 The exchange was
involved in a major calamity in trying to upgrade its computer-
ized systems and create a paperless settlement system. The
unsuccessful project, called "Taurus," caused losses totaling
hundreds of millions of dollars.20 The LSE then created an elec-
tronic, order-driven trading system' and decided to demutual-
ize and become a commercial company. As a result, the LSE's
listing authority was transferred to the FSA-UK.23 Thereafter,
the LSE announced that it was planning to merge with the
316. Futures Exchanges: Everlasting LIFFE, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 73.
317. Alan Cowell, London Futures Exchange to Reorganize, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 1998, at C4; London Exchange Begins Electronic Trading System, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 1, 1998, at C17. As one source notes:
CBOT was once the dominant global futures market, but Eurex now
occupies that position.... [T]he Swiss-German market managed in
the first seven months of 2002 to expand on its global leadership posi-
tion. During this period, it managed a total of 445 million contracts,
up 20% on the first seven months of 2001. Its main European rival,
the EuronextLiffe axis, managed 419 million contracts; Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange 319 million contracts; and CBOT 186 million con-
tracts.
Eurex Aims to Open Up U.S. Market, HANDELSBLATT (Eng. version), Aug. 19,
2002, available at LEXIS, Global News Wire.
318. LIFFE was acquired by Euronext in 2001. Alex Skorecki, Exchanges
Take First Steps to Alliance, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002, at 28.
319. See generally Bradley, supra note 250, at 662-64 (describing the LSE
and its history).
320. Glenn Whitney, Giant London Bourse Seeks New Identity and Focus
After Costly Project Fails, WALL ST. J., April 22, 1993, at All.
321. Sara Calian & Sylvia Ascarelli, London Launches Big Bang II for
Share Trading, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at A20.
322. FSA, THE TRANSFER OF THE LISTING AUTHORITY TO THE FSA 3 (Dec.
1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubscpcp37.pdf.
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Deutsche B6rse in Frankfurt. The merged company was to be
known as iX-International Exchange and was to be linked with
the Nasdaq market in the U.S.3 The proposal was widely criti-
cized and set off a competing takeover effort by the OM Grup-
pen AB ("OM"), the owner of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 4
The LSE survived, but was forced to reorganize itself and drop
the proposal to merge with the Deutsche B6rse.2
VII. FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY OF JAPAN
Like the U.S. and the U.K., the form of Japan's present regu-
latory structure is best explained by its history.3 After World
War II, General Douglas MacArthur's Supreme Command re-
quired the adoption of provisions from U.S. laws regulating fi-
nance, including the securities laws and the Glass-Steagall
Act."' This new legislation established a Securities Commission
for the Supervision of Securities Business based on the Ameri-
can SEC. 8 Japan did not permit bank holding companies, but
banks became members of the keiretsu, i.e., large companies
joining in cooperative units with cross-shareholding, which be-
came the dominant force within the Japanese economy after
World War 11.3129 The Bank of Japan acted as the country's cen-
323. Erik Portanger, Swedish Concern OM Launches Hostile Bid Valued at
$1.19 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2000, at A18.
324. OM also supplied support services for other exchanges and trading
platforms, including the California Power Exchange. Silvia Ascarelli, Swedes
Set Formal Bid for the LSE, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2000, at A21.
325. See generally Bradley, supra note 250, at 697-98 (describing the take-
over battle).
326. Japan has been credited with creating the world's first futures ex-
change. Mark D. West, Private Ordering in Japan, Private Ordering at the
World's First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000). Stock markets
were organized in 1874 under an ordinance that was based on the rules of the
London Stock Exchange. Andrew M. Pardieck, The Formation and Transfor-
mation of Securities Law in Japan: From the Bubble to the Big Bang, 19
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 7 (2001).
327. The provisions for securities and banking regulation were set forth in
Article 65 of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law. Hideki Kanda, Se-
curitization in Japan, 8 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 359, 367 (1998).
328. Laurence, supra note 281, at 669.
329. See Corinne A. Franzen, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corpo-
rations: Is Bank Monitoring the Answer, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 292
(1993) (describing the cross-shareholding of the keiretsu). The American oc-
cupying authorities tried to break up the zaibatsu, or cartels, which had con-
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tral bank, setting monetary policy, while the Ministry of Fi-
nance ("MoF") was responsible for financial policy. 33
The MoF became a monolithic component of Japanese fi-
nance331 and managed the economy on both a micro and macro
level, leaving only a limited central banking role to the Bank of
Japan. To secure its position, the MoF abolished the Securities
Commission for the Supervision of Securities Business in 1952
and replaced it with its own Securities Bureau.12 Other aspects
of the U.S.-style regulatory system were also abandoned in later
years.3 3 The MoF then assumed a dual role of regulator and
business promoter. 334 Though it was the sole governmental fi-
nancial regulator, SROs, including the exchanges and the
Japanese Securities Dealers Association, also provided some
minimal regulatory functions.335
The Japanese economy prospered, experiencing growth rates
of 10% a year between 1950 and 1970.336 The period of growth
continued into the 1980s. The Japanese economy was viewed as
an "economic miracle," and its manufacturing processes (e.g.,
trolled Japan's economy before World War II. Gregory D. Ruback, Comment,
Master of Puppets: How Japan's Ministry of Finance Orchestrates Its Own
Reformation, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 185, 189-90 (1998). They were simply
replaced by the keiretsu. For a description of the rebuilding of Japan after
World War II, see JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF
WORLD WAR 11 (1999).
330. See generally Dafei Chen, Acute Symptoms of Chronic Problems: Ja-
pan's Procrastination in Solving Its Bank Crisis, the Current Situation and a
Future Perspective, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 269, 274 (2000).
331. The MoF assumed control of much of Japanese banking during the
1930s. Ruback, supra note 329, at 189. During World War II, a Japanese
Securities Exchange was created by the government, replacing nine private
exchanges. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 7.
332. The MoF also created a Banking Bureau and an Insurance Bureau to
regulate these industries. An International Finance Bureau conducted over-
sight of foreign financial activities of private firms. Chen, supra note 330, at
274.
333. Laurence, supra note 281, at 669.
334. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 8. The MoF often placed its senior officials
as executives at financial institutions. These institutions also maintained
offices at the MoF to further communications. Ruback, supra note 329, at
199-200.
335. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 24-27.
336. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 278.
The recovery of the Japanese economy was aided by grants and loans from the
U.S., as well as a defense umbrella. Id.
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"just-in-time") were widely copied. Moreover, the Japanese
worker was well disciplined. The average Japanese household
had savings of $100,000, 33' much of which was held in postal
savings accounts.338 The high-quality goods produced in Japan
penetrated markets everywhere. The U.S. was an especially
attractive market, providing easy access, even though Japan's
restrictive trade practices were excluding American goods from
the Japanese market.
In the 1980s, however, a "bubble economy" developed in Ja-
pan. The stock market boomed, and real estate prices more
than doubled between 1986 and 1990. Scandals soon unfolded.
In the "Recruit Cosmos" affair, Prime Minister Noboru Take-
shita resigned after it was discovered that some 160 influential
politicians had been given Recruit Cosmos stock at bargain
prices in 1986, just before the company went public.339 In an-
other scandal, the Hanshin Sogo Bank sold a large amount of
stock it held in the Tateho Chemical Company the day before
the company announced large losses. No wrongdoing was
found, to the consternation of many.34 Nui Onoue, the "Bubble
Lady," became famous for borrowing billions of dollars on her
restaurants in order to invest in the stock market. The
amounts she borrowed were greater than the value of those
properties. She had also used forged certificates of deposit for
her trading activities. Eventually, the Bubble Lady, who used
337. Chen, supra note 330, at 277.
338. A unique part of the Japanese financial system has been the provision
of postal savings accounts by the government. These accounts received high
interest rates and were tax sheltered. In 2000, some 20% of all Japanese per-
sonal assets were held in postal savings accounts. BROOME & MARKHAM, su-
pra note 11, at 958. In 2002, $25 trillion was held in Japanese postal savings
accounts. James K. Glassman, A Growth Season for Japanese Stocks?, WASH.
POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at HOL. The Japanese government used the monies in
these accounts to fund its own operations. The postal savings accounts were
placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions, rather than the MoF. Richard E. Nohe, A Different Time, A Different
Place: Breaking Up Telephone Companies in the United States and Japan, 48
FED. COMM. L. J. 307, 314 (1996).
339. Ex-NTT Chief Found Guilty in Recruit Scandal, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 9,
1990, at 3.
340. Laurence, supra note 281, at 670.
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s6ances to pick stocks, was sentenced to twelve years in
prison.341
The bursting of the Japanese economic bubble at the begin-
ning of the 1990s sent the economy into a deep recession that
the country is still struggling with today" - massive deflation
was experienced; the Nikkei 225 index dropped from 39,000 to
11,000; land prices in large cities dropped eleven years in a row;
government debt grew to 150% of GDP, as compared with 33%
in the U.S.;343 and bad debt held by Japanese banks grew to
some 30% of GDP. 34  The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed, the
first to do so in Japan since World War II."5 Nineteen of Ja-
pan's largest banks had capital shortages that threatened their
ability to meet the Basel Committees guidelines for interna-
tional banks." Yamaichi Securities, the fourth largest securi-
ties firm in Japan,"7 also failed. Yamaichi had hid its losses in
off-book accounts, apparently with the knowledge of at least one
MoF official.4 8 In the early 1990s there were a series of "loss
compensation" scandals, in which it was discovered that the
country's four largest brokerage firms were covering the trading
341. Stefan Wagstyl, Bank Chief in Japan's Turbulent Years, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 6, 2000, at 12; Robert Thomson, Institutions in Dock Beside
Bubble Lady, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 6, 1992, at 6.
342. The Bank of Japan introduced a zero interest rate policy as a way of
putting the economy back on its feet. Ken Belson, World Business Briefing
Asia: Japan: Monetary Policy Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Wl.
343. Glassman, supra note 338.
344. Time to Wake Up, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1998, at 21.
345. Eric C. Sibbitt, A Brave New World for M&A of Financial Institutions
in Japan: Big Bang Financial Deregulation and the New Environment for
Corporate Combinations of Financial Institutions, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.
965, 967 (1998).
346. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 269.
347. The Bank of Japan bailed out the Yamaichi firm in 1965 by agreeing to
provide an unlimited amount of loans. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE U.S., supra note 15, at 343. When the firm failed in 1997, it owed the
Bank of Japan $3.95 billion. Three executives were arrested by Japanese
authorities. Merrill Lynch bought the Yamaichi securities operations, but lost
several hundred millions in dollars over the next few years from that invest-
ment. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 268.
Merrill Lynch ended up closing most of those operations. David Ibison, Japan
Refuses to Offer Up Easy Money For Foreign Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), July
2, 2002, at 31.
348. Michiyo Nakamoto, Prosecutors Raid Industrial Bank of Japan, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 10, 1998, at 6.
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losses of important clients and politicians.49 In 1997, the na-
tion's largest securities firm, Nomura, became mired in scandal,
after it was discovered that the firm had covered the trading
losses of a gangster and engaged in widespread abusive sales
practices.35
The Japanese government took several steps to deal with this
deteriorating situation. The Japanese Diet passed the Finan-
cial Reform Act of 1992, which allowed the MoF to establish
capital requirements for banks and allowed banks to own secu-
rities affiliates. The act also aimed to further competition
among financial institutions. Furthermore, a Securities Ex-
change and Surveillance Commission ("SESC") was created in
1992 to police the securities markets.' This legislation osten-
sibly reduced the MoF's role as the director agency for the
placement of financial resources."2 In application, however, the
MoF remained firmly in control of financial services firms and
the SESC 3" Greater reform was attempted in 1996 by means of
a "Japanese Big Bang" that sought to emulate the one in the
U.K. and deregulate Japan's financial services. The Japanese
Big Bang tried to ease market entry and remove non-
competitive practices. 4 Commissions were unfixed. The plan
was formulated by a Financial System Research Council to al-
low banks, insurance companies, and brokerage firms to com-
pete with each other without the prior restrictions that had
kept these sectors separate. 55 The government also announced
349. See generally Masahisa Ikeda, The Legality of Compensating Investors
in Japanese Securities Market, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 592 (1992) (describing
these scandals).
350. David Ibison, A Banking Star is Brought to Earth, FIN. TIMES (London),
Aug. 8, 2002, at 15.
351. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 9.
352. Sibbitt, supra note 345, at 987-89.
353. Chen, supra note 330, at 276.
354. Ruback, supra note 329, at 217.
355. Jessica C. Wiley, Note, Will the "Bang" Mean "Big" Changes to Japa-
nese Financial Laws, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 380, 394 (1999).
Under existing regulations, strict separation of securities and banking was
required - even separate entrances were required for a firm with banking
and securities operations in the same building. Despite the Big Bang goal of
removing such restrictions, they were apparently still in place in July 2002.
Mizuho to Open One-Stop Money Shop, AsAHI SHIMBUN, July 17, 2002. See
also Yanagisawa Panel Call for Promotion of Market Functioning, JAPAN
WKLY. MONITOR, July 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, IACNWS 88685779 (advo-
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a "Total Plan" to deal with the mass of non-performing debt in
the economy and to dissolve bankrupt companies.35 Although
public funds were used to shore up shaky banks, Japan's banks
still maintain some $1.3 trillion in bad debts.5
Another scandal arose after the Tokyo Prosecutor's Office
staged a large-scale raid involving 100 investigators on the MoF
offices in 1998.38 The Prosecutor was seeking information on
bribes in the form of lavish entertainment and discount loans
allegedly paid to MoF bank examiners by those being exam-
ined.59 Two examiners were arrested and a third committed
suicide.3" More legislation followed in the form of a Financial
Reconstruction Law for failed financial institutions and a Fi-
nancial Early Strengthening Law that allowed public funds to
be used to shore up weak or failing banks. These laws were to
be administered by a five-member governmental body called the
Financial Reconstruction Commission. 6'
The SESC was transferred out of the MoF in 1998, along with
an independent Financial Supervisory Agency, which was suc-
ceeded by the Financial Services Agency ("FSA-Japan") in
2000.6 The FSA-Japan was also given the power, previously
cating fewer regulatory distinctions among securities, banking, and insur-
ance).
356. Chen, supra note 330, at 278.
357. Hampered, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002 (Finance & Economics) [hereinaf-
ter Hampered].
358. Andrew Chin, Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints Facing Random Regu-
latory Inspections in Japan and the United States, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
99, 99-101 (1999)
359. Japan's Mighty Ministry Trembles, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1998,
at 4.
360. Ruback, supra note 329, at 211. Eventually, 112 MoF officials were
sanctioned, along with six of Japan's largest banks. Chin, supra note 358, at
100.
361. Japan's Financial Sector Reform: Progress and Challenges, Hakuo
Yanagisawa, Minister for Financial Services Japan, Address before the Finan-
cial Services Authority (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/
gaiyou/gaiyoue/presen/20010903.html.
362. Securities & Exchange Surveillance Commission, History and Func-
tions, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/news/others/20010723.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2002). The Financial Supervisory agency was merged with
the MoF Financial System Planning Bureau to form FSA-Japan. Masaharu
Hino, On the Establishment of the Financial Services Agency, Address Before
the Bank of England (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/gaiyou/
gaiyouelpresen/p2000913.html [hereinafter Hino Address]
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held by the MoF, to set securities policy and to regulate securi-
ties and banking. The SESC continued its operations under
authority from the FSA-Japan, which in turn was supervised by
the Financial Reconstruction Commission."3 More reform legis-
lation was adopted: the ban on holding companies was re-
moved,3' and consumer protection was enhanced through the
Law Concerning the Sale of Financial Products.6 5
Some have expressed concern that all of these reforms may
not have accomplished very much. The SESC lacked strong
enforcement mechanisms1 - it is only an investigative agency.
The SESC has no authority to impose sanctions, but may refer
matters for sanctions. In practice, however, few referrals have
been made to date.6 In 2001, the SESC had a relatively small
staff, at least in comparison to the SEC in the U.S.,6" and most
363. The Financial Reconstruction Commission quickly encountered scan-
dal, and critics charged that it was maintaining the insular and clubby ap-
proach of the MoF. A Loss of Appetite, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2000 (Japanese
Financial Regulation) [hereinafter A Loss of Appetite]. The FSA's organiza-
tion and role in the government is a somewhat confusing one. See FSA, About
the Financial Services Agency, Organization (Jan. 2002), at http:/www.fsa.
go.jp/info/infoe.html.
364. Sibbitt, supra note 345, at 993-94.
365. Adopted in 2000, this statute required greater disclosures to customers
purchasing financial products. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 69-70. A Con-
sumer Contract Act that was also passed in 2000 allowed customers to rescind
contracts if they were misinformed about the nature of the transaction and
precluded broad disclaimers of liability. Id. at 74-78.
366. The SESC chairman promised to "Kick out Rogue Broker-Dealers" and
"show up our presence" through enforcement actions. Takeo Takahashi, New
Chairman, Inaugural Address (July 23, 2001), at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/
english/news/others/20010723.htm. The SESC was investigating the manipu-
lation of stock prices by derivative firms trying to avoid paying a bonus cou-
pon on Reverse Convertible Bonds. Press Release, SESC, An Annual An-
nouncement of Activity (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/
english/news/others/20010903.htm. In 2000, the SESC filed only five cases
with the prosecutor's office and made thirty-four recommendations for disci-
plinary actions to FSA-Japan. Id. Between 1992 to June 2001, the SESC
made 188 recommendations to FSA-Japan for disciplinary actions. SESC,
What We Do 5, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/actions/actions-menu.
htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
367. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 9-14.
368. The SESC staff is about one tenth the size of the SEC. Phred Dvorak,
Walking Wounded, One Reason Stocks in Japan Stay Low: Zombie Companies,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at Al; Pardieck, supra note 326, at 86; Ruback,
supra note 329, at 226. The SESC has disputed this contention, noting that it
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of them had been transferred from the MoF.369 To be sure, the
MoF does appear to retain some policy control.3"0 FSA-Japan
also experienced a faltering start. When FSA-Japan did try to
take aggressive action by urging vast bad debt write-offs, many
small and medium-sized companies went bankrupt. 1 FSA-
Japan then eased off, pressuring the banks and using public
funds to save the Daiei supermarket chain and Koizumi, a con-
struction company, both of which had massive amounts of bad
debt. However, there were no bailouts for small companies.372
The government nationalized the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank, after these institutions
could no longer be kept afloat."' Public funds were also injected
into all but one major bank. 4
FSA-Japan announced that it was undertaking inspections of
large troubled banks in order to address their bad debt prob-
lems.35 The project was supposed to be a "Japanese sword" for
dealing with the problem, but the result was largely to shore up
some troubled banks.36 Critics claimed that FSA-Japan was
"whitewashing" the bad debt problem in Japan.77 After down-
grading Japan's debt, a credit rating agency claimed that FSA-
Japan was engaging in regulatory forbearance as a way to aid
has a much smaller universe to regulate than the SEC in the U.S.. Laurence,
supra note 281, at 677-78. The SESC is composed of a three member commis-
sion and has eleven regional offices. SESC, ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/aboutsesc02.pdf (last visited Mar.
20, 2003).
369. Chen, supra note 330, at 269, 285.
370. Ruback, supra note 329, at 223-24.
371. Review, ASAHI SHIMBUN, July 17, 2002.
372. Hampered, supra note 357; Review, ASAHI SHIMBUN, July 17, 2002.
373. The remaining assets of these banks were sold. Former management
of both banks were being prosecuted. Several financial institutions were also
put into bankruptcy, a rarity in Japan. Hino Address, supra note 362.
374. Hakuo Yanagisawa, Japan's Financial Sector Reform: Progress and
Challenges, Address Before the Financial Services Authority, London (Sept. 3,
2001), at http://www.fsa.go.jp/gaiyou/gaiyoue/presen/p20010903.html.
375. FSA-Japan seems to place heavy regulatory emphasis on inspections, a
costly and time-consuming form of regulation requiring considerable man-
power. FSA, Financial Services Agency Program Year 200.1 Basic Guidelines
and Basic Plan for Inspections (July 30, 2001), at www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/
e20010730-1.html.
376. Tomomi Miyazaki, ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 1, 2002.
377. Japan - Can Japan's Banks Clean Up?, THE BANKER, May 1, 2002.
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the economy "in the hope that something will turn up."378 The
agency was waffling on reform in other areas. Japan dropped
its insurance guaranty for customer funds held in time deposit
accounts, limiting claims to about $83,000. This was intended
to assure more market discipline, but it instead raised concerns
that funds would be pulled out of already unstable institutions,
weakening them further.79 When a similar proposal limiting
deposit insurance on ordinary deposit accounts met political
opposition FSA-Japan started backtracking.8 ' It then extended
government insurance on some deposits, a breach of its promise
to eliminate unlimited guarantees.381
FSA-Japan seemed to be retreating from promised reform
measures in the insurance industry and was stalling on allow-
ing commercial banks, such as the one sought by Sony, to be
licensed. 2 The Japanese government continued the old MoF
role of trying to manage the economy in other ways. Most re-
cently, despite FSA-Japan's push for a market solution, the
government suggested that more banks should merge and that
it would offer a higher government guarantee to encourage such
actions.83 In fact, several of Japan's largest banks did merge to
form colossal enterprises, the largest being Mizuho Holdings,
Inc, composed of Daiichi Bank, Fuji Bank, and the Industrial
Bank of Japan.8 4
FSA-Japan was accused of trying to manipulate the Nikkei
225 index through short sale restrictions, which were modeled
378. David Ibison, Bank Regulator Criticized for Lack of Action, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 6, 2002, at 10.
379. David Pilling, Regulator Drafts Plan for Japanese Bank Mergers, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 11, 2002, at 9; David Pilling, Japan May Move to Hasten
Banking Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES (London), July 8, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Pill-
ing, Japan May Move].
380. Another Tokyo Setback, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A14.
381. Japan Set to Break Deposits Pledge, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002,
at 1.
382. A Loss of Appetite, supra note 363. The U.S. also rejected the operation
of commercial banks such as one proposed by Wal-Mart and Sony in the U.S.
when the GLBA was adopted in 1999. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its
History and Future, supra note 4, at 264, 278 n.347.
383. Pilling, Japan May Move, supra note 379, at 7.
384. Alexandra Nusbaum, Investment Trust Hopes Lift Tokyo, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 29, 2000, at 24.
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after those of the SEC in the U.S.385 Like the MoF, FSA-Japan
has often been lenient, at least on Japanese banks. For exam-
ple, FSA-Japan merely issued a warning to a Japanese bank
that hid key information from inspectors.386  FSA-Japan has
shown that it does know how to play tough, at least where for-
eigners are involved. FSA-Japan accused two American firms
of improper short sales, in another attempt to support the mar-
ket. 7 In 1999, the Tokyo branch of Credit Suisse was excluded
from engaging in the derivatives business in Japan after sev-
eral abuses.8 FSA-Japan denied the consequent claims that it
was discriminating against foreign firms.388
The Nikkei 225 Index remains 74% below its high in 1989."
An advisory committee to FSA-Japan has recommended that
stocks be sold at post offices as a means of shifting corporate
financing away from bank loans and towards the equity mar-
kets in order to inflate the stock market.8 ' The committee also
385. Some Securities Dealers Have Already Been Punished for Breaking
Body, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 19, 2002.
386. Mizuho Given Warning in May for Misleading FSA, ASAHI SHIMBUN,
June 19, 2002.
387. David Ibison, Nikkei Was Manipulated by Japan, Say Banks, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 13, 2002, at 1.
388. Michael S. Bennett & Michael J. Marin, The Casablanca Paradigm:
Regulatory Risk in the Asian Financial Derivatives Markets, 5 STAN. J. L. Bus.
& FIN. 1, 26 (1999). A criminal indictment was brought by Japanese prosecu-
tors against the firm for concealing documents. Phred Dvorak & Erik Portan-
ger, London Division of Credit Suisse is Indicted in Tokyo, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
1999, at A23.
389. Takeshi Uera, Policies of Japan's FSA Misunderstood, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 18, 2002, at 14. Disciplinary action was also taken against JP
Morgan by FSA Japan and against Nikko Salomon. Bayan Rahman, JP Mor-
gan Japan Arm Ban, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 1-2, 2003, at 8; Jason Singer,
Japanese Regulators Penalize Nikko Salomon, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2003, at
B10. American regulators have not been unwilling to employ a heavy hand in
disciplining Japanese firms. See United States v. Iguchi, 1997 WL 593018 (2d
Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) A Japanese rogue trader, who lost $1 billion
in unauthorized trading, was jailed, and Daiwa Bank, the victim of this em-
ployee, was fined $340 million for failing to report the losses promptly to U.S.
regulatory authorities. That was then the largest criminal fine in history. Id.
390. Phred Dvorak, Walking Wounded, One Reason Stocks in Japan Stay
Low: Zombie Companies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at Al.
391. A proposal to reform the postal service was "emasculated." Another
Tokyo Setback, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A14. Japanese savings habits
remain a matter of continuing concern. "The Japanese have a mammoth $122
trillion in household savings but invest just 4.4% of their financial assets in
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supported a continuing role for the government in bailing out
troubled banks.392 The Bank of Japan followed up that proposal
with an announcement that it would be buying the stock of
companies held by banks.393 This was said to be a "shocking"
manipulation of the stock market designed for the benefit of the
banks."4 The Bank of Japan, FSA-Japan, and the MoF were
said to be at an impasse over policy disputes. 5 On the positive
side, the agency was seeking greater public disclosures from
firms in precarious financial circumstances. 6 It raised its bank
capital adequacy threshold for intervention and correction, but
capital levels at Japanese banks were still well below the Basel
minimum international standard. 7 FSA-Japan allowed banks
to sell life and other insurance and announced that it was al-
lowing bank affiliated brokers to do so as well. 9 After some
well publicized insurance firm failures, FSA-Japan increased
regulatory controls over the industry, requiring, among other
things, marked-to-market accounting and increasing solvency
margins. 9 At the same time barriers to entry were being low-
ered, allowing some foreign competition."
stocks, compared with about 18% for Americans." Dvorak, supra note 390, at
Al.
392. Panel Calls for Shift to Direct Financing, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, July
15, 2002, available at LEXIS, IACNWS 89070940.
393. David Pilling, Dramatic Action by BoJ to Shore Up Banks, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 19, 2002, at 10; Phred Dvorak, Japan's Central Bank Will Buy
Stocks Held by Troubled Lenders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at Al. This led
to a loss of confidence in the government's bond issues. Ken Belson, Not
Enough Bidders for Bond Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at Cl.
394. Japanese Central Bank Plans to Buy Stocks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh), Sept. 19, 2003, at 3D.
395. Ken Belson, Not Enough Bidders for Bond Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
21, 2002, at Cl.
396. FSA Wants Companies to Disclose Vulnerability, YOMIURI SHIMBUN
DAILY YOMIURI, July 5, 2002, at 1.
397. Watchdog Raises Bank Scrutiny, ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 27, 2002. Large
Japanese banks had capital of about one-fourth of that required by the Basel
standard. Hampered, supra note 357.
398. FSA to Allow Bank's Securities Units to Sell Life Insurance, JAPAN
WKLY. MONITOR, June 24, 2002, available at LEXIS, IACNWS 87698011. The
Asahi Shimbun and Wire Reports, ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 21, 2002; Banking on
Deregulation, INS. DAY, May 3, 2001, at 4.
399. Japan's FSA Tightens Up Sector Regulation, INS. DAY, Apr. 26, 2001, at
5. A self-assessment system was implemented for setting reserve require-
ments. Hino Address, supra note 362, T1 16. Japanese insurance companies
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VIII. WHICH IS BETTER?
From a distance at least, the regulatory model developed by
the U.K. has a great deal of theoretical appeal. ' The different
areas of the financial services industry have been gradually in-
termingling over the last quarter of a century. The American
model of regulating each facet of finance is based on the histori-
cal separation of financial services and not on their current
status. As Howard Davies, the Chairman of the FSA-UK, noted
in answering his own rhetorical question of why his country
should move to a super regulator:
Because financial markets move on, the sectoral system put in
place in the late 1980s is no longer fit for the purpose at the
beginning of the 21' t century. The old divisions between
banks, insurance companies, securities firms, investment
managers, and the rest, do not reflect the way the financial
sector is now organized. Banks own insurance companies, and
vice versa. Insurance companies own fund managers. The
most rapidly growing mortgage bank is owned by a mutual life
insurer. Lloyds TSB now incorporates Scottish Widows. What
continued to experience a loss in profitability as a result of the disinflation in
the economy. Insurers Must Abandon Herd Mentality, YOMIURI SHIMBUN
DAILY YOMIURI, June 11, 2002, at 1, 1-2. The industry was consolidating. See
Outlook on Japan life Insurers Remains Negative, PR NEWSWIRE, June 7, 2002,
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-binstories.pl?ACCT=105&
STORY=/www/stroy/06-06-2002/0001742568; Life Insurers Plan Pension Fund
Management Alliance, BESTWIRE, Apr. 10, 2001. FSA-Japan has allowed
mergers of life and non-life insurers, aiding the trend toward consolidation.
Bayan Rahman, Dai-Ichi and Yasuda Moot 316 Billion Dollar Link, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2000, at 20; One Result of Japan's Big Bang .... ,
INS. DAY, Oct. 2, 2001, at 9.
400. Charles Garnsworthy, Life Crisis Prompts Change, REINSURANCE MAG.,
May 1, 2002, at 26; A Growing Influence on the Japanese Scene, INS. DAY, Dec.
6, 2000, at 7.
401. The super regulator is becoming an increasingly popular model. Ger-
many only recently created a single regulator - the Federal Agency for Fi-
nancial Services Supervision. G. Thomas Sims, Germany Wants New Regula-
tor to Boost Confidence, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2002, at A13. South Korea also
created a Financial Supervisory System as a unified regulator. Andrew Ward,
UBS and Merrill Punished for Leaks, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 2002, at
17.
394 BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 28:2
do you call Citigroup, which includes Citibank, Travellers,
Salomon Smith Barney and, now, Schroders? 2
Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the U.S.. It is
best exemplified by the Chairman's reference to Citigroup, ' a
modern financial services firm that sells products across all
business lines.4" There are few, if any, remaining conventional
banks that only take deposits and make loans, surviving on the
spread."5 Merrill Lynch is, for example, not just a broker-
402. Howard Davies, Scrutiny has Sharpened Resolve of City Watchdog,
TIMES (London), May 2, 2000, at 26.
403. International financial behemoths such as Citigroup raise other con-
cerns:
Who regulates Citigroup, the world's largest and most diverse finan-
cial institution? With its operations in over 100 countries, selling just
about every financial product that has ever been invented, probably
every financial regulator in the world feels that Citi is, to some de-
gree, his problem.... Yet in a sense nobody truly regulates Citi: it is
a global firm in a world of national and sometimes sector watchdogs.
The same is true of AIG, General Electric, UBS, Deutsche Bank and
many more.
The Regulator Who Isn't There, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2002.
404. Banks now sell 40% of the annuities sold in the U.S.. Jeff D. Opdyke, A
Risk-Free Way to Beat the Dow?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at D1.
405. As a 1995 U.S. Treasury memorandum also noted with respect to the
traditional banking business:
The share of total private financial assets held by insured depository
institutions has declined sharply, from about 60 percent in 1970 to
less than 35 percent today.
Only 15 percent of all financial assets held by households and the
non-profit sector in 1994 was accounted for by insured deposits.
Recent data show that, of the 20 largest financial firms in the United
States. Only 5 are commercial banks. Moreover, a number of diversi-
fied financial services firms own non-bank, thrift institutions, or in-
dustrial loan companies.
The differences between the products of banks and non-bank finan-
cial firms have been increasingly blurred. The emergence of similar
products by different firms operating under different regulatory re-
gimes results in complicated competitive and regulatory issues.
A number of commercial banks engage in little or no traditional
banking - funding commercial loans with deposits. Rather, they
specialize in trading activities, consumer finance, or fee-based ser-
vices.
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dealer. It sells insurance, provides bank services, manages
portfolios, and engages in a wide range of financial services that
compete with those of the large banks.4"
The single regulator approach provides FSA-UK with the
ability to approach financial regulation from a larger perspec-
tive. The agency is able to focus on those objectives and to de-
cide how they can be met in the most rational fashion, rather
than through competition with other regulators."7 As a single
regulator, the FSA-UK can be refreshingly candid about what it
is able to accomplish, advising the public that it "does not aim
to prevent all failure" and that it "recognizes the proper respon-
sibilities of consumers themselves and of firms own manage-
ment and the impossibility and undesirability of removing all
risk and failure from the financial system ...."" There is,
however, an important factor present in the U.K. that is not
Capital markets have become increasingly globalized, and financial
markets in different countries have become more interdependent.
Technological innovations such as remote banking and digital cash
daily redefine the nature and delivery of financial services and the
respective roles played by bank and non-bank firms. For example,
the date processing firm EDS is the second largest owner/operator of
ATMs in the U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE
SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FROM JOAN
AFFLECK-SMITH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS POLICY (Oct. 23,
1995) [hereinafter DOT, MEMO ON FINANCIAL SERVICES].
406. As Merrill Lynch notes:
The financial services industry continues to be affected by an intensi-
fying competitive environment, as demonstrated by consolidation
through mergers and acquisitions, competition from new and estab-
lished competitors using the Internet or other technology, and dimin-
ishing margins in many mature products and services. The trend of
consolidation of commercial and investment banks made possible by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has also increased the con'petition for
investment banking business through the use of lending activities in
conjunction with investment banking activities.
MERRILL LYNCH, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 17, available at
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/annrep200llar/discussion.html.
407. The FSA-UK has taken this ability seriously and has thoughtfully ad-
dressed its statutory objectives and how they can be met. FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY, 2002 A NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW MILLENIUM (Jan. 2000), avail-
able at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/index-chrono-2000.html.
408. INTRO. TO THE FSA, supra note 295, at 7.
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found in Japan, the other super regulator country considered in
this Article. There is a long and well developed culture in the
U.K. of avoiding governmental interference in business."9 The
FSA-UK, while reflecting a political demand for more regula-
tion, is still a non-governmental body that remains an extension
of the City's cultural abhorrence to intrusive regulation. Lon-
don has learned from long experience that, while there will al-
ways be scandals and failures, each should be viewed as sui
generis and dealt with accordingly.
Japan, in contrast, has a regulatory culture of intervention
and economic management. The MoF managed the economy
with some success in its early stages; Japan even threatened
the U.S. competitively."' That MoF model, while successful
during the growth period of the Japanese economy, failed as the
economy became more complex.41' The insular nature of Japan's
financial structure crumbled in the face of global competition
that the country could no longer avoid. Mounting scandals,
which were unearthed as the economy declined, required that
the MoF be removed at least from the front door of regulation.
The creation of FSA-Japan gave lip service to finding market
solutions to the economic malaise in Japan, but that agency still
seems to cling to the culture of managing the economy by sup-
porting large banks and resisting foreign competition. Conse-
quently, the Japanese super regulator model does not seem to
be a desirable one to mimic. A developed economy is simply too
complex to be managed by bureaucrats, no matter how brilliant.
409. See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 275, at 613 (describing the reasons
for this hands-off culture).
410. See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING (1986) (describing
the competitive threat to American automobile manufacturers from Japan).
411. This is a point best left to the economists, but it seems that managed
and command economies may do well in their early growth stages and then
collapse as the economy becomes too complex for such management. The most
extreme example is the former Soviet Union. The country's economy recov-
ered to its pre-World War II levels within five years of the conclusion of that
conflict despite the damage wreaked by the Germans. Its economy continued
to expand for a time before falling apart. At the end, eighteen million bureau-
crats were trying to substitute for a market. The result was shortages in 234
out of 277 basic consumer goods. Alexander Belozertsev & Jerry W. Mark-
ham, Commodity Exchanges and the Privatization of the Agricultural Sector in
the Commonwealth of Independent States - Needed Steps in Creating a Mar-
ket Economy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 128-31 (1992).
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This brings us to the American competitive regulatory model.
The GLBA enshrined the concept of "functional" regulation,
which means that a diversified financial services firm that has
a bank in its holding company structure will have a plethora of
regulators with substantively different and sometimes conflict-
ing regulatory requirements. Such a firm will face regulation
from several bank regulators, including the Federal Reserve
Board, the FDIC, and either the Comptroller of the Currency or
a state bank regulator. The firm will also be regulated by the
CFTC and the SEC, plus one hundred or more state securities
and insurance commissions."' The firm will further be subject
to regulation by various self-regulatory organizations, including
NASDR, probably the NYSE, various options exchanges, the
National Futures Association, and possibly various contract
markets such as the Chicago Board of Trade. If that were not
enough, such entities must also undergo the scrutiny of an ever-
increasing list of "gatekeepers," including accountants, lawyers,
analysts, NRSROS, and outside directors. The Federal Trade
Commission is using its cold calling and false advertising regu-
latory powers to appear in joint "sweeps" with the SEC and
CFTC.4 13 There are also state attorney general wolf packs and
an increasingly aggressive Justice Department that will happily
destroy a large firm and devastate its employees' careers be-
cause of the wrongdoing of a few."4 What exactly is functional
about this morass?
The American regulatory culture is an aggressive one, reflect-
ing a strong anti-business bias."5 In the context of the SEC and
412. The District of Columbia must also be counted.
413. See supra note 259. The FTC was also seeking a $215 million fine from
Citigroup, perhaps the most regulated firm in the world, for predatory lending
practices. Citigroup to Settle Lending Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2002, at
C12; What's News, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at Al.
414. See infra notes 424-25, 433 and accompanying text.
415. The author has tried to catalogue this cultural bias elsewhere. It can
be traced at least to Thomas Jefferson's antipathy to the northern merchants,
and was fueled by Andrew Jackson's destruction of the Bank of the U.S. and
the excesses of the Robber Barons. The harsh competition practiced by the
trusts also gave it strength. The "populists," the "muckrakers," and the
"money trust hunt" laid the groundwork for the New Deal financial legislation
that was anti-business in its thrust and which is popularly viewed, without
any apparent justification, to have saved America during the Great Depres-
sion. The questionable payment scandals of the 1970s and the insider trading
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CFTC, there are numerous instances of this aggressiveness.
Insider trading prosecutions are a prime example. Such
charges have not been vigorously pursued in Tokyo or London."1 6
The Sumitomo copper case also makes an interesting case
study. Sumitomo Corp., a large Japanese trading company, was
the victim of a rogue trader who was manipulating the world
copper market, mostly through trading conducted in the London
markets. The unauthorized activities of this trader, Yasuo
Hamanaka, cost Sumitomo $2.6 billion in trading losses, a
rather severe punishment in and of itself. Despite the fact that
Hamanaka's trading had only a tangential relationship to the
U.S., the CFTC brought a case against Sumitomo and fined the
company a record amount of $150 million. Japan and the U.K.
only piggybacked onto this action. Japan prosecuted the rogue
trader. Most of the trading at issue took place in London, but
scandals of the 1980s caused a rebirth of the anti-business movement in
American culture. See 1-3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra
notes 15, 42, 274. Now Enron has freed these demons once again.
416. An FSA-UK official stated that he could "count the number of U.K.
insider-trading cases on the fingers of one hand, 'and still have a few to play
with.'" Anita Ragahaven et al., Europe's Police Are Out of Luck on Insider
Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2000, at C1. Japan was even more of an "insider's
paradise." Laurence, supra note 281, at 670. Japan has been prodded into
being more vigorous against insider traders. Between 1992 to June 2001, the
SESC filed thirty-six cases with the prosecutor, thirteen of which involved
insider trading. Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, What We
Do, at http://www.fsa.go.jpfsesclenglisb/actions/actions.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2003). These regulators have also responded to other SEC initiatives. The
FSA-UK adopted the SEC view on selective disclosure to analysts. See, eg.,
Silvia Ascarelli, U.K to Bolster Rules That Bar Select Briefings with Analysts,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2000, at A21 (describing the FSA-UK's views). In doing
so, however, the FSA-UK allowed its firms to take corrective actions and
noted that market forces were requiring the change in any event. Randall
Smith & Aaron Luchetti, How Spitzer Will Affect Wall Street, WALL ST. J.,
May 22, 2002, at C1. The FSA-UK has also been more gingerly than the SEC
in its approach to the regulation of electronic communications networks. Sil-
via Ascarelli, U.K. Regulators Seek Advice on Ways to Oversee Electronic Trad-
ing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2000, at C22; Mark Atherton, FSA Reviews Share
Deal Rules, TIMES (London), Apr. 26, 2001, at 28. Both Japan and the U.K.
have expressed concern that the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has gone too far
and could adversely affect their companies. See, e.g., Edward Alden, Japan
Joins Chorus of Disapproval on New U.S. Corporate Rules, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Aug. 1, 2002, at 6.
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the FSA-UK asked only for its costs in investigating the matter,
some $8 million.17
The Enron affair and subsequent accounting scandals under-
score the weakness and instability of this competitive regula-
tory culture, particularly when politics intervene. '18 Competi-
tive regulation did not stop any of these massive accounting
frauds."1 9 The hysteria attending the Enron affair in Congres-
sional hearings was another appalling chapter in our financial
history.2 ' Berating and badgering witnesses, demanding only
417. Aaron Lucchetti, CFTC Fines Sumitomo a Record $150 Million, WALL
ST. J., May 12, 1998, at C19. See also In the Matter of Sumitomo Corp.,
[1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Commodity Futures L. Rep. (CCH) 27,327
(C.F.T.C. 1998) (CFTC consent decision).
418. These scandals turned on various schemes to manage or falsify earn-
ings, a concern that has been around for decades. George Getschow, Paper
Profits, Slick Accounting Ploys Help Many Companies Improve Their Income,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 1980, at 1. In 1999 - before Enron - the SEC had
been investigating managed earnings. Thomas S. Mulligan, New Wave of
Accounting Probes Deepens Fear, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at Cl. Concern
with accounting practices is also an old issue. SEC Chief Urges Accountants
to Improve Self-Regulation or Risk U.S. Intervention, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
1980, at 11. See also Charles Stabler, Accountants' Self-Regulatory Efforts Get
SEC Praise, But Further Steps Are Urged, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1978, at 4 (SEC
submits massive 1,300 page report on accounting profession to Congress).
419. See, eg., Anita Raghavan et al., Full Speed Ahead: How Enron Bosses
Created a Culture of Pushing Limits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2002, at Al (de-
scribing guilty plea by an Enron financial officer); Sheila McNulty & Peter
Spiegel, Former Enron Executive Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 22, 2002, at 23 (same). See also Elizabeth Douglas et al., The
Nation, Former Phone Execs Arrested, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al (de-
scribing the WorldCom fraud).
420. The newspapers joined this lynch mob with enthusiasm. See, e.g.,
Raghavan et al., supra note 419 (describing Enron executives as bad boys who
went to strip bars, drove fast cars, and paid $500 per month for a parking
spot). Of a kin was an English author's supercilious suggestion that Enron
and other accounting scandals might evidence that Karl Marx was correct in
claiming that capitalism was victimizing society. Niall Ferguson, Marx, Niall
Ferguson Says Capital's Author was Right about the Class Struggle, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 17, 2002, at 1. The low was reached in the "Women of
Enron" photo spread in the August 2002 issue of Playboy. See Women of En-
ron, PLAYBOY, Aug. 2002, at 118. At that point, all that was lacking was an
article in the National Enquirer claiming that the Enron executives were chil-
dren of aliens from outer space. The gap was filled when the scandal over
whether Martha Stewart, the guru of domestic living, had engaged in insider
trading in ImClone Stock. The mob positively howled. See, e.g., Holman Jen-
kins Jr., Business World: An Autumnal Resolution: Give Martha a Break,
399
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yes or no answers to convoluted and complex questions, mock-
ing witnesses and cutting off their answers when it was not fa-
vorable to the Congressional inquisitor, and requiring witnesses
to take the Fifth Amendment in front of cameras had all the
trappings and foulness of a McCarthy era hearing. 4 ' The SEC
WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2002, at A23 (describing the allegations). The scandal
over Jack Welch's retirement benefits set off another feeding frenzy. Despite
the fact that he had added billions of dollars of value to General Electric, the
press was claiming he had acted improperly after it was revealed in a divorce
case that he was given perquisites valued at about $2.5 million per year.
Those perks included such things as tickets to sporting events, and the opera,
a small consulting fee, an apartment, office, and use of a corporate jet, all of
which had been negotiated with outside directors and disclosed. See, e.g.,
Matt Murray et al., GE Pact With Welch Raises Eyebrows, WALL ST. J., Sept.
9, 2002, at B4; Jack Welch, My Dilemma and How I Resolved It, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2002, at A14. These two celebrities were not the only targets of the
press. One of the more silly charges claimed that a Merrill Lynch analyst was
somehow corrupted by an exchange of wine and champagne with the CEO of
Tyco, who was later indicted for tax evasion and looting Tyco. See, e.g., Pat-
rick McGeehan, Lawyer Says Ex-Merrill Analyst Traded Gifts with Tyco Chief,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at Cl.
421. The fact that a great many people seem surprised that a severe market
downturn would expose abuses is beyond comprehension, particularly after an
unprecedented ten-year bull market that predictably covered up a multitude
of sins. The dismay expressed for the 5,000 or so laid-off Enron employees
and even Enron shareholders also seems somewhat affected, when one consid-
ers the fact that Motorola, Nortel, Corning, Lucent, and Procter & Gamble
have each laid off tens of thousands of employees in the last few years. There
were no cries of outrage when those employees were left without a job. These
companies' shares, many of which were held in employee 401(k) accounts,
sustained major losses, but there were few cries to lynch the executives. See,
e.g., Richard Waters, Nortel Spasm Causes Pain for Sector Rivals, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 29, 2002, at 1 (describing the continuing problems in the tele-
com industry). The difference in the case of Enron was the result of several
factors that went beyond a concern for fraudulent accounting practices, as
serious as they may be. The stock market was falling in 2001, and the Enron
collapse was a signal to find a scapegoat for that downturn. This was also a
political opportunity. The Democrats could not attack President Bush over
the "War on Terror," so they turned to the economy and Enron. The Republi-
cans could not let the Democrats out-Enron them since the coming elections
would decide control of Congress by one party or the other. The Republicans
became as strident as the Democrats as this quickly turned into an election
issue. See, e.g., John Harwood & Shailagh Murray, Guns and Butter: For Fall
Campaigns, a Tension between Economy and Security, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30,
2002, at Al; Jeff Zeleny, Democrat Hopefuls Dig in on Economy; Moderates
Warn Attacks on Business Could Backfire, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 9, 2002, at
N9.
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joined the witch-hunt, requiring the CEOs of America, guilty or
not, to take a loyalty oath to full disclosure by swearing to the
accuracy of their company's financial statements. 4" Hastily
drafted legislation led to an incredible increase in the SEC's
budget and more redundant layers of regulation were added."
Competitive regulation, at least in a crisis, results in bad
judgment of an extreme character. Exhibit A is the Justice De-
partment's indictment and trial of Arthur Andersen, LLP.2
Tens of thousands Arthur Andersen employees worldwide, far
outnumbering the affected Enron employees, were forced to find
new jobs even though they did not participate in the alleged
wrongdoing of the one individual found responsible for the con-
viction of the firm.4 " The conviction also badly damaged Enron
Corporate accountability even became an issue in gubernatorial con-
tests, as if the governors could do anything about SEC accounting issues. See,
e.g., Randal Archibold, Cuomo is Saving His Firepower For End of Race, Ad-
visers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at B6 (New York race); Mark Z. Bara-
bak, Bush Steps Carefully Into State, L.A TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at Al (Cali-
fornia race). Of course, corporate accountability is not a new issue, having
arisen in the questionable payment scandals of the 1970s. See, e.g., Stan
Crock, Manager's Journal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1978.
422. See Andrew Hill, Wall Street's Next Focus is 'Oath' Deadline, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 5, 2002, at 19. In the end, only sixteen of the 691 reporting
companies required to take this oath were unable to certify their financial
statements. Krissah Williams, 16 of 691 Firms Missed Deadline; SEC is Un-
decided on Consequences, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at E03.
423. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
424. Arthur Andersen, LLP was Enron's auditor. The accounting firm was
indicted and later convicted of obstructing justice by trying to cover up certain
improper accounting practices. See generally ENRON CORP., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002). Arthur Andersen had also been found
liable in some earlier accounting scandals, and the company was effectively
destroyed after its conviction. See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts, Verdict No Boon for
Enron Plaintiffs, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2002, at 1 (describing effects of verdict).
425. The verdict in the Andersen case was extremely bizarre. The Justice
Department had charged Arthur Andersen with obstruction of justice based
on document shredding by an accountant in the Houston office, who had pled
guilty to wrongdoing. The jury, however, convicted the firm on the basis of a
memorandum written by an Andersen attorney on another issue. See, e.g.,
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Team Weighs Asking Judge to Undo Guilty Ver-
dict, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at C1. The Andersen attorney had testified at
length before Congress concerning the memorandum in question. The issue
was again raised during the Andersen trial, after the government's star wit-
ness turned out to be favorable to the defense. The Andersen attorney, how-
ever, was kept off the stand and could not testify in Andersen's defense be-
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investors. A settlement proposal by Arthur Andersen of $750
million, to be paid substantially out of future revenues, was
presumably only an opening bid and was rejected by class ac-
tion plaintiffs; it was reduced to $375 million as the govern-
ment's indictment approached. That too was taken off the table
after the conviction, and plaintiffs are now negotiating a $60
million settlement from the parent company of Arthur Ander-
sen, LLP."6 Further recoveries from the convicted auditing firm
are problematic, since it is forfeiting its right to practice, cut-
ting off future revenues that could have been used to compen-
sate investors and Enron employees."'
The disclosure of other accounting frauds witnessed Gestapo-
like dawn raids on the homes of corporate executives. Busi-
nessmen, whose only violent act in their entire lives was per-
haps an attack on a tennis ball, were manacled and frog-
marched before news cameras during their "perp walk." 8 This
was a particularly sordid adjunct to this whole affair. 9 The
cause the Justice Department had sent her a target letter. See, e.g., Greg
Burns, Who is Nancy Temple?, NEWSDAY, June 30, 2002, at FOL.
426. Forty million dollars of this amount was for Enron investors and the
rest is for creditors. Peter Spiegel, Andersen Worldwide in $60 Million Set-
tlement over Enron, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2002, at 17.
427. Mitchell Pacelle & Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen Worldwide Sets Likely
Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at C1. The frenzy over the corporate scan-
dals arising from the Enron debacle cost the American economy an estimated
$35 billion, an amount equal to a rise in oil of $10 per barrel of oil. World,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002, at 1.
428. WorldCom and Adelphia executives were among those given the "perp
walk" treatment. See, e.g., Joshua Chaffin et al., Ex-WorldCom Chiefs Ar-
rested, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 2002, at 1. The manacling and parading
of the seventy-eight year old non-violent founder of Adelphia before the as-
sembled press and cameras was particularly obscene, drawing a protest from
the New York Civil Liberties Union. See, e.g., Fred 0. Williams, Adelphia
Creditors Object to Rigas Loans, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 14, 2002, at B5. See
also Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (staged "perp walk" violated
Fourth Amendment).
429. See Those CEO Perp Walks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2002, at A18 (object-
ing to this practice); Herbert J. Hoelter, The Corporate Scandals, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 25, 2002, at B04 (same). In contrast to the treatment given these execu-
tives, a federal judge has held the New York City government in contempt for
not providing hearings to inmates previously found with weapons before
handcuffing them for transportation. Such inmates must be given an oppor-
tunity to show they are not violent before they are shackled and must be al-
lowed to establish whether the shackling is harmful to their health. Fines
imposed on the city for violating those requirements are to be credited to the
[Vol. 28:2402
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pillory was an ancient punishment that has been long banned
for all crimes, except, it now appears, for financial ones. 3' A
conviction is not even required before this punishment is ap-
plied to corporate executives. If this were not enough, New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer showed up to conduct his
own sideshow,431demanding a $100 million fine from Merrill
Lynch before turning to others in an effort to create a regula-
tory empire on Wall Street over stock analysts.4 3 This led to
inmates' own accounts. See, e.g., Cerisse Anderson, Correction Department
Found in Contempt Over Handcuffing, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 2002, at 1.
430. The pillory was a popular punishment meted out by the Star Chamber
in England for economic crimes. For example, in 1630, an individual found
guilty of forestalling, (i.e., holding goods off the market in hopes of creating a
shortage and causing prices to rise), was required to stand in the pillory at
New Gate Market with a sign affixed to his hat identifying his crime.
REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COURTS OF STAR CHAMBER AND HIGH COMMISSION 42-
43 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1965). The long abolished medieval crimes
of engrossing, regrating, and forestalling have also been brought back to pun-
ish corporations. See, e.g., Sheila McNulty, FERC Judge Says El Paso United
Acted Illegally in Energy Crisis, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 2002, at 1
(Administrative Law Judge at Federal Energy Regulatory Commission finds
company withheld supplies from market in order to obtain higher price).
431. There is some precedent for Attorney General Spitzer's crusades. In-
deed, lest you think that the Enron scandal and other recent business contre-
temps are unique, the American Ice Company scandal at the beginning of the
twentieth century had all the elements of those episodes and a pardon scandal
to boot. Like Enron, the American Ice Company made large amounts of con-
tributions to politicians and engaged in questionable accounting practices.
Like Enron, it was one of the largest companies in the U.S. before it was con-
sumed in scandal. Its monopoly over a vital consumer product at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century was so complete that, at least in comparison,
Microsoft might be likened to a benevolent society for the protection of com-
petitors. Like Merrill Lynch, the American Ice Company was the target of a
crusading New York attorney general. A presidential pardon of the American
Ice Company's president was as controversial as Bill Clinton's pardon of Marc
Rich. See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRICES & CHOICES, MICROECONOMIC VIGNETTES
189 (3d ed.1993) (describing the American Ice Company scandal). See also Ice
Trust Declared to be Unlawful, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1900, at 1 (describing
attorney general's action against the American Ice Company); Robert C. Ken-
nedy, Hunting the Octopus, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2002, at
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/1006.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2003) (describing the political fight over the Ice Trust Case);
Antitrust Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1912, at 32, 32-33 (survey of anti-
trust actions by state attorney generals).
432. Attorney General Spitzer continued his quest, focusing on Jack Grub-
man, an analyst at Salomon Smith Barney. Spitzer was investigating a prac-
tice called "spinning," i.e., allocating shares in a hot IPO to officers of other
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another campaign by a newly formed wolf pack composed of
forty state regulators.33
Competitive regulation inevitably means more regulation.
For some reason, there are never quite enough regulatory tools
in the drawer. Each scandal results in a claim by the regulator
involved that it needs more regulatory power and additional
rules are adopted, even though library shelves are already filled
with statutes and regulations so complex that some law school
clients in order to gain underwriting business. See generally Randall Smith &
Susan Pulliam, Buddy System: How a Technology-Banking Star Doled Out
Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at Al. Such practices had
been the subject of regulatory concern since at least 1997, but there were no
headlines in it for the attorney general to intervene while the market was
trending upward. Michael Siconolfi, NASD Warns on "Spinning" IPO Shares,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at Cl; The Motley Fool Column, ST. LouIs POST
DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 1998, at BU6. Not to be outdone by Spitzer, Congress an-
nounced its own hearings. Tom Hamburger et al., Salomon IPO Deals Pro-
voke Congress, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at Cl. But Spitzer was already on
to bigger game - Citigroup - giving rise to speculation that he may even be
after Sandy Weill, the head of Citigroup. Charles Gasparino, Inquiry Into
Salomon Widens to Include Possible Weill Role, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2002, at
Al; Joshua Chaffin & Gary Silverman, Spitzer Subpoena for AT&T Files, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 24, 2002, at 10.
Spinning was not new to Wall Street. The preferred lists of J.P. Mor-
gan & Co. had been condemned at length in the hearings that led to the en-
actment of the federal securities laws. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE U.S., supra note 15, at 145-46. Does this mean all of this regulation has
been for nothing? In another remarkable episode, the Financial Times of
London announced that executives made $3.3 billion before the failure of their
companies, which included Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossings. Len
Cheng, 3.3 Billion Dollars for Executives of Failed Companies, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 31, 2002, at 1. Spitzer then announced that he would be inves-
tigating those executives for receiving that compensation. Lionel Barber &
Gary Silverman, NY State Attorney Probes Awards to Heads of Bankrupt
Groups, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 2002, at 1.
433. The SEC sought to compete by launching its own investigations. See
Michael Schroeder, States' Wall Street Probe Bogs Down, WALL ST. J., Sept.
13, 2001, at C5. The analysts' investigations resulted in a spectacular $1.4
billion joint settlement between several large investment banks and state and
federal securities regulators. See generally Charles Gasparino, Analyst Pact is
Held Up by Words, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at Cl. Citigroup alone paid
$450 million in that settlement. Randall Smith, Regulators Set Pact, But
Some Issues Still Remain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002.
The state attorney generals were also using their new found power to
press businessmen for campaign contributions. Tom Hamburger & Michael
Schroeder, The Economy: Spitzer Heads Bill at Campaign Event for Attorney
Generals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2002, at A2.
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professors spend their entire careers studying those promul-
gated by just one agency. A further layer of regulation is al-
ways needed after each scandal, even though a simple fraud
prohibition would cover nearly every misdeed of concern. But
competing agencies have a vested interest in scandals. Scan-
dals allow the regulators to claim they need more resources;
they allow the agencies to grow, expand, and compete more
forcefully with other agencies.
Of course, we must be careful of what we wish for in life. A
single regulator may also seek to expand its powers after a
scandal. A single regulator will also undoubtedly use bad
judgment in times of crisis. A single regulator could also stifle
competition, over-regulate, and cause a loss of competitive posi-
tion in international markets.434 It could even try to become a
Japanese MoF that seeks to manage the economy by bureau-
cratic fiat. There would be no competition to prove which regu-
lator can be the most aggressive. There would be no pressure
for more resources in order to best a competing regulator. '35
It may also be argued that competition leads to less restric-
tive regulation, at least for some market participants. A case in
point is the CFTC and SEC. The futures industry has enjoyed
low margins, no suitability requirement, little insider trading
restrictions, etc. If a monolithic agency with an SEC viewpoint
had been in place, such regulatory burdens would probably not
have been avoided. Of course, if the single regulator had a
CFTC viewpoint, the securities industry's burdens might have
been eased. Another argument is that the regulatory wars be-
tween the CFTC and SEC diverted the attention of these agen-
cies and allowed the over-the-counter derivatives industry to
develop. While this may be true, that development was still
impeded by the CFTC's defense of the contract market monop-
oly, which led to much derivatives business moving abroad.
The federal securities laws and the Commodity Exchange Act
need to be revisited and revised from the ground up. The regu-
434. These concerns are described at greater length in Markham, Banking
Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 4, at 272-85.
435. A Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services chaired by Vice-
President George H. Bush in 1984 cautioned that "[t]hroughout American
history, no single government authority has ever been entrusted with regula-
tory authority over all American banks." BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note
1, at 8.
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latory structure imposed in the 1930s was directed at a market
far different from the one that exists today.43 There has been a
massive transformation of the financial markets437 - history
has simply outstripped regulation. Financial service firms now
cross all product lines. As the Treasury Department has noted:
"[I]n light of the changing market shares, the emergence of new
financial products and technology, and the disintegration of
traditional industry and product lines . . . there needs to be a
fundamental reassessment of why and how we regulate finan-
cial firms."38
Traditional broker-dealers and futures commission mer-
chants are nearly extinct. Broker-dealers are selling insurance,
making loans, and looking very much like banks.4 39  Broker-
dealers, as well as banks, are also selling insurance. Insurance
companies are reinventing themselves and becoming diversified
financial services firms.14 ' Financial engineering has melded
commercial and investment banking together, a fact now recog-
nized by GLBA. The futures commission merchant business
has evolved into an over-the-counter derivatives dealer. De-
rivatives and securities products are being blended. Moreover,
financial services are becoming a global business, in which
American firms must compete with large international firms
that cross-sell financial products and are subject to much
lighter regulation than that found in the U.S.4 4 ' Electronic trad-
436. The regulatory burdens imposed on financial firms are the result of
accumulated abuses over the years. The incongruity of many of those regula-
tions is obvious. The non-violators must bear the regulatory burdens for the
conduct of the miscreants. The innocent are punished long after the guilty
have left the scene.
437. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215.
438. DOT, MEMO ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 405 (italics omitted).
439. The Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account provides all the benefits
of a bank account, as well as those of a brokerage account. See Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 1358, 1361-62 (D. Del. 1983).
440. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 235-
36.
441. A single regulator would also facilitate coordination among regulators
on an international level, a need underscored by the BCCI debacle. The Basel
Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO") are currently coordinating such regulation, but their roles are sim-
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ing offers further challenges. Another concern is the interna-
tionalization of financial services. The confusion, complexity,
and costs associated with multiple regulators will certainly
place U.S. financial institutions at a severe competitive disad-
vantage with European and even Japanese firms that operate
under a single regulatory umbrella.
Technology is removing much of the structure on which our
current functional regulatory system is based. Technology pro-
vides a means to bypass traditional intermediaries such as the
exchanges, banks, and broker-dealers. Institutional investors
may use Instinet or other ECNs to avoid paying the spread on a
NASDAQ or a NYSE listed security; securities customers need
not pay a large commission to a broker-dealer to execute an or-
der. Rather, it can be done online relatively cheaply. Insurance
agents are being circumvented through online purchases.
Loans and other commercial bank services are also being mar-
keted outside traditional bank channels.
There are serious political roadblocks to such an amalgama-
tion. Each current regulatory agency has its own constituency
ply placed on top of the mass of regulators in the U.S. The growth of interna-
tional exchange linkages and electronic trading is also raising the stakes for
those regulators. Conflicts are also occurring at the international level. See,
e.g., Compliment, European Companies With UD Listing Fail to Escape Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, at http'Jwww.compliment.com/securities-uk/dailynews/ (last
visited Aug. 30, 2002) (describing objection by European Union to requirement
that Europeans swear to the accuracy of their financial statements before a
U.S. agency); Lydia Adetunji, SEC Votes to Include Foreign Company Chiefs,
FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2002, at 7 (describing SEC indifference to those
concerns). The European Union is also posing regulatory challenges through
its financial directives that seek a single European market in financial ser-
vices. See generally Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Comment, An International
Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform: Could the European Union's Second
Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates Its Own
Financial Services Industry, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1715, 1732-33, 1738
(1999) (noting that the European Union seeks harmonized regulation as a way
to improve the competitive position of banks in member countries); James
Mackintosh, Regulator to Warn Against Brussels Boardroom Plans, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 30, 2002, at 14 (expressing concern that European Union fi-
nancial directive could weaken corporate governance standards, which are
claimed to be higher than those in the U.S.); Erik Portanger, Politics and
Pride Slow Drive for Pan-European Securities Regulator, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,
2000, at C7 (discussing need for a pan-European regulator in light of the
merger of several European stock exchanges and political obstacles to such
regulation).
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in the industries that have developed competitive positions
based on regulatory restrictions. 42 The regulatory agencies
themselves will fight fiercely to protect their territory, as dem-
onstrated by the CFTC and SEC conflicts. Congressional com-
mittees also have their own jurisdictions to guard. Neverthe-
less, the functional system of regulation now existing in Amer-
ica needs to be abandoned. In its place, regulatory attention
needs to be directed as to who needs regulation and who does
not.
443
For example, regulatory protections of the insurance fund
should be uniform and limited. The current excuse for intrusive
regulation as being necessary to protect the insurance fund
should also be reexamined. Brokerage firms already obtain in-
surance from the private sector in excess of that provided by
SIPC without such intrusive regulation. The concern with
systemic risk from large failures of financial institutions could
be addressed across sector lines. Value At Risk programs could
replace the labyrinth adopted by the SEC and CFTC in their
net capital programs. With respect to fraud, the SEC and
CFTC already recognize that sophisticated "accredited" inves-
tors do not need the same regulatory protections as the prover-
bial widows and orphans.4 4 5 This approach should be applied to
442. There have been efforts to combine regulatory responsibilities. For
example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") has unsuccessfully pro-
posed the creation of a single department for financial services regulation.
CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, FINANCIAL REGULATION FOR THE 21' CENTURY
(1995). The CME proposal was not a particularly radical one, since it would
have continued functional regulation in bureaus within the department. Id.
443. This proposal is discussed at greater length in Broome & Markham,
supra note 19, at 776-84.
444. See Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note
4, at 284 (discussing private insurance alternatives).
445. "It was understood, even before the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933, that institutional investors did not need the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem of that Act to protect themselves when acquiring securities. These inves-
tors could 'fend for themselves."' Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall
Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities
Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 659 (1995). See also, e.g., Regulations and
Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2002) (exempting securities
from registration that are sold to accredited investors); CFTC Regulation 17
C.F.R § 4.7 (exempting institutions and wealthy individuals from certain dis-
closure requirements). The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
("CFMA"), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, is another example where
regulatory distinctions are made between large and small firms. Access to
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all financial services. Regulation should be directed at protect-
ing small investors from overreaching and fraud.44 Accredited
investors can take care of themselves in addressing those
risks.47
derivative transaction facilities ("DTFs") is limited to large institutions, except
that a DTF may allow non-institutional access if introduced through an in-
termediary registered with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant.
Such FCMs must, however, have minimum net capital of at least $20 million,
assuring a responsible intermediary. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2000),
amended by The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A.
446. Most violations by broker-dealers, and certainly the most egregious,
are committed by small under-capitalized firms that have little to lose if
caught and much to gain by fraud and other misconduct. Yet, the SEC makes
little distinction between large and small brokerage firms. The large firms
must, therefore, bear the costs imposed by the fly-by-night firms. Large firms
do not need such intensive regulation. They have an incentive to protect their
assets from short-term profits generated by fraud that impose larger long-
term costs in damages and reputational loss. Further, they have assets that
are available to compensate those injured by employees who go astray.
The federal banking laws contain a limited recognition of the disparity
of regulatory problems emanating from smaller, less capitalized institutions.
Prior to 1991, all banks paid a uniform 12 cents per $100 of deposits as pre-
miums for deposit insurance. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), changed that methodology by
instituting a system of risk-based deposit insurance premiums that imposed
greater costs on institutions that provided the greatest threats to the deposit
fund. Banking regulations also utilize the concept of "well capitalized" to al-
low larger banks to engage in activities that less capitalized institutions
would be inclined to engage in without adequate controls. BROOME &
MARKHAM, supra note 11, at 465 (also noting that the reserve fund for the
FDIC is now fully funded for the required reserves and deposit premiums are
not presently being collected). For example, banks are also restricted in ac-
cepting brokered deposits unless they are well capitalized. 12 U.S.C. §
1831f(a) (2000). The GLBA requires that a bank holding company be well
capitalized to be certified as a financial holding company that may engage in a
broad range of financial activities outside customary banking channels. 12
U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (2000).
447. An official of the Federal Reserve Board has argued that even unso-
phisticated consumers should be able to buy unregulated products. Indeed,
consumers already have a choice of depositing their funds either in an unin-
sured money market account or in an insured bank account. Oliver I. Ireland,
Fed. Associate General Counsel, New Regulatory Models Institutional vs
Functional Regulation, Paper presented at the Annual Chicago-Kent Confer-
ence on Derivatives Transactions (Oct. 1999) (on file with author).
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In sum, a more modern regulatory model should also be based
on the following principles:
(1) Institutions dealing with other institutions should not be
subject to intrusive regulation. Institutions are able to watch
out for themselves and do not need a government agency to
protect them from other members of their industry.
(2) Markets in which only institutions operate should not be
regulated. Once again, institutions are able to protect them-
selves and have the bargaining power to demand information
needed for trading.
(3) Unregulated markets should be allowed to operate in which
non-institutional customers may gain access through well
capitalized intermediaries. Those intermediaries have assets
and reputations to protect, which should be sufficient incen-
tive for them to avoid fraud.
(4) Retail customers should be allowed to deal with unregu-
lated intermediaries even in regulated markets, provided that
the intermediary is well capitalized and the customer is fully
informed of the lack of regulation.
(5) Markets should be allowed to operate, in which intermedi-
aries that are not well capitalized service retail customer or-
ders. But such markets, and those intermediaries that are not
well capitalized, will be subject to regulation to assure their
financial soundness.
IX. CONCLUSION
The issue of the desirability of a single super regulator over
securities and derivatives has been debated since the creation of
the CFTC in 1975. There has been little success in achieving
any unified regulation. Still, the issue will not recede, and a
unified regulator seems to be a sound idea. The model provided
by the FSA-UK lends support for such unification, while the
model presented by the FSA-Japan shows the weaknesses of
such an approach. Should America choose a super regulator, it
must be cautious to avoid an agency that will seek to manage
the economy or respond to every financial crisis with more in-
trusive regulation. Until then, we must suffer under a competi-
tive system of regulation that is competing for more - and not
less - regulation.
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